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ABSTRACT 
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There is no doubt that the water authorities in India have to think and to work towards allocative
water management strategies to ensure long-term judicious land and water development and 
management. Allocative water management strategies offer great opportunities to significantly
improve the water productivity in agriculture and in other sectors. It also offers opportunities in
combating environmental degradation and in the reconstruction of degenerated natural resources..
This report presents a problem analysis and a first inventory and assessment of the opportunities
and implications of allocative water management in terms of (economical) water benefits,
agricultural benefits and ecological benefits. The report also presents tools for strategical and
operational allocative water management and details on institutional aspects. 
 
The project activities were discontinued in 2007. This report describes the activities executed from 
May 2006 to March 2007 and is aimed as initial knowlegde base and starting point for further
investigations. 
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Preface 
In May 2006, the BO Cluster International Cooperation and International 
Agreements requested Wageningen UR to conduct the project Land, Water and 
Ecosystems management in the Krishna River basin, in the framework of Bilateral 
Project Activities. 
 
The DLO institutes Alterra, PRI, LEI and WI were commissioned to execute the 
project. A project proposal was composed, presenting details on the problem 
statement, objectives, approach, activities, timeframe and outputs. 
 
In the proposal a project duration of 4 years was envisaged (2006-2009). However, in 
October 2006 the BO Cluster management decided that the financial support to the 
project would be discontinued in 2007.  
 
As a result, only the project outputs that were planned for 2007 were achieved. To 
avoid that the obtained information would be lost (or become inaccessible) a report 
was composed presenting the contributions of the individual DLO institutes.  
 
The present report gives an overview of the results to date. The various 
contributions have, however, not been processed nor synergized, nor (internally and 
externally) reviewed, which implies that there may not be consensus on all details. 
 
The present report should, therefore, be considered as an inception report and/or 
initial knowledge base for further research, rather than a conclusive document. 
 
 
 
Wageningen, Herco Jansen (contact person)1, May 2007 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Alterra, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands. Email: herco.jansen@wur.nl. 
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1 Introduction 
Herco Jansen, Bart Snellen2 
 
1.1 General outline  
India is the world’s major irrigating country with the major share of the water 
resources being used for irrigation. The demand for water from both the agricultural 
and the non-agricultural sectors is growing rapidly, causing an increased pressure on 
available water resources. In many areas overexploitation of the resources and 
environmental degradation are already manifest.  The national and state governments 
of India, therefore, face huge challenges in water management.  
 
In addressing water scarcity issues, there is currently no (clear) prioritization of water 
allocation. In the case of water scarcity the Irrigation Department envisages equitable 
distribution among the water users. This practice of “sharing the scarcity” (rather 
than reallocation of water to water uses that generate a high value per unit of water) 
results in low irrigation productivity, low yields, low cropping intensity and reduced 
opportunities for diversifying agriculture.   
 
Allocative water management implies prioritization in water allocation (at catchment 
level) and the establishment of discriminate service levels for the different water uses. 
This will result that farmers will optimize their farming system according to the 
service level of water supply (reliability of water supply), which will lead to an 
increase of the agricultural productivity.  The gains from such water reallocation can 
be immense if there are significant differences in the value per unit of water 
consumed across farming systems. 
 
In addition to a productivity increase in agriculture, allocative water management 
strategies offer great opportunities in combating environmental degradation and even 
in the reconstruction of degenerated natural resources.  
 
The project “Land, Water and Ecosystems management in the Krishna River basin” 
envisages to show the potential benefits of allocative water management as a possible 
(future) alternative of the present water management practices (paradigm shift: 
“prioritization rather than equity”). The hypothesis that a change in water management 
practices can lead to a significant increase in overall agricultural productivity, whilst 
offering opportunities for environmental reconstruction, is being investigated.  
 
This report presents the (preliminary) results obtained in Phase 1, executed from May 
2006 to March 2007. Phase 1 of the project was financed by the Dutch Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality in the framework of bilateral project activities 
for policy support to the Cluster International Cooperation and International 
                                                          
2  Alterra, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands 
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Agreements. Additional financing was provided through the Andhra Pradesh Water 
Management Project (AP-WAM), financed by the Government of India and the 
Food and Agricultural Organisation of the UN. In addition there has been synergy 
with activities by the International Water Management Institute (Hyderabad) and 
with PhD research at Wageningen University. 
 
 
1.2 Objectives  
The goal of the project “Land, Water and Ecosystems management in the Krishna 
River basin” is judicious land and water development and management in the Krishna River 
Basin. 
 
The purpose is to support the LNV policy (and policies in India) on socially, 
economically and environmentally sustainable use of water, with focus on decision 
support in water allocation, improved water productivity in agriculture, and 
combating (deltaic) environmental degradation. 
 
 
1.3 The Krishna River Basin 
Allocative water management can only be effectively implemented if land and water 
resources are managed at (sub) catchment level. Although the project envisages to 
develop generic methodologies and tools (i.e. that can similarly be applied to other 
areas, or upscaled for larger areas), these methodologies and tools will firstly be 
applied to a selected “pilot catchment”, in order to show their applicability. The 
existing water management problems and the ongoing WUR/DLO activities on 
water management in the Krishna river basin (see also Section 1.1) make this area a 
very suitable case for such a river basin study. To ensure relatively rapid 
results/outputs a further delimitation to selected subcatchments was made (see 
Section 1.4). 
 
The Krishna River has its origin near the west coast of India and its delta is located 
in the State of Andhra Pradesh at the east coast. The watershed comprises an area of 
250,000 km2, being equivalent to approximately 8 % of the surface area of India as a 
whole. At present, the governments recognize problems in the basins related to: 
 
• Lack of information for land, water and ecosystem management (Box 1); 
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Box 1 
 
At the scale level of (sub)catchments, the responsible executive water management agencies 
do not have adequate information and tools for setting the right priorities in water allocation 
policies, and for the planning of land and water interventions, being both strategic (spatial 
planning, the construction of infrastructures, etc) and operational interventions.  
 
Water allocation to the different water uses and within the same sector (agriculture) is not 
optimum, not only in times or situations of water scarcity, but also when the water is 
abundantly available.  There is also no good insight in repercussions of land and water 
policies and interventions on ecosystems and other water uses, which often manifest 
themselves hundreds of kilometers downstream. 
 
• Lack of (financial) incentives and accountability mechanism for providing 
reliable irrigation services by irrigation agencies and for efficient water use by 
farmers (Box 2); 
 
Box 2 
 
In relation to the abovementioned lack of information (at the appropriate level) and proper 
prioritization in water allocation, it is presently not possible to establish discriminate service 
levels for water allocation. Discriminate “service levels” are required to ensure maximum 
water productivity, especially in situations of water scarcity. Cost recovery mechanisms 
(based on the “profit principle”) can only be successful if –at the end of the day- water 
authorities are made accountable for their services.  The willingness to pay and efficient 
water use by farmers is strongly related to the accountability of the service-providers. 
 
• Low water productivity in the agricultural sector, both in irrigated agriculture 
and in (partly) rain-dependent agriculture (Box 3); 
Box 3 
 
In the case of unreliable irrigation water supply farmers tend to opt for low-productive, 
low-investment and low-risk crops and farming systems. The productivity will increase 
if the risks (of water shortage) can be better assessed and if the irrigation water 
supply would be less erratic. A more reliable irrigation water supply will promote 
investments by farmers and thus enhance productivity. In addition, crops and crop 
varieties can be improved, so that productive crops that are well adapted to the 
different risk levels of water (and salinity) stress are grown. 
 
• Upstream agricultural practices and other land and water interventions 
resulting in deterioration of (deltaic) ecosystems, salt water intrusion and 
salinisation in the deltas; 
 
• Adverse impacts of large-scale introduction of aquaculture on coastal 
ecosystems. 
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1.4 Approach and activities 
Study area 
On the basis of scientific, policy relevance and practical criteria a further delimitation 
to selected subcatchments was made (see also Section 8.3). The (entire) sub-
catchments that discharge into the Krishna River between the Nagarjuna Sagar 
Project and the Prakasam Barrage of Vijayawada were selected as study area. This 
area covers approximately 36000 km2. 
 
Water uses 
Allocative water management implies prioritization of water allocation to the most 
productive water uses. In the project the focus will be on the different agricultural 
water uses (farming systems). It is thus assumed that the water uses “drinking water” 
and “industries” should a priori get a higher priority in water allocation than 
agriculture3 (their present water use is also minor in comparison with agriculture). 
The water use by other uses (e.g. recreation, energy supply, transport) is not 
considered at this stage. 
 
Focus of activities 
In 2006 activities have been undertaken to outline the concepts for quantitative river 
basin analyses, current farming systems, water valuation, institutional instruments in 
water allocation, coastal zone productions systems, and stakeholder analyses. A 
database with (spatial and temporal) land- and water data has also been prepared.  
 
Information for land, water and ecosystem management (see also Box 1 of 
Section 1.3) 
Allocative water management requires that the water management entities have 
adequate information on the hydrological system (at the appropriate level) and on the 
repercussions of any management intervention. Such information requires a 
hydrological system analysis and a monitoring system. The project activities have 
been aimed at developing a general applicable methodology with minimum data 
collection, which is not location-specific and which does not require primary data.  
 
Farming systems and water productivity (see also Box 3 of Section 1.3) 
Allocative water management implies discriminative service levels for irrigation water 
supply, related to the productivity of farming systems. Various existing and potential 
farming systems have be identified and described in terms of input use and (financial) 
output. A first classification has been made on the basis of secondary information on 
cropping and farming systems. Thereafter a detailed survey was started for selected 
areas.  
 
In the study area, the reliability of water is, generally, the dominant factor for the 
farming system. The eventual objective of the data search and survey was, therefore, 
to identify and quantitatively describe (including productivity) feasible farming 
systems, for different service levels (i.e. levels of water reliability). 
                                                          
3 It is noted that with this limitation (potential) impacts such as pollution are ignored. If appropriate, the implications of impacts for water 
allocation may be addressed at a later stage of the project. 
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Water valuation 
Given the objectives of the project, the economic components have been focused on 
elaborating a methodology that is capable of assessing the private economic impacts 
of water (re)allocation. The sustainable financial management of irrigation 
infrastructures was not within the scope of the project. 
 
At a later stage, the returns of irrigation water for different farming systems will be 
further quantified.  
 
Institutional issues 
Allocative water management can have large social and political implications. The 
project will not address how these can be overcome, however the critical institutional 
issues in water reallocation and enforcement have been inventoried. Possible 
instruments for allocation and reallocation of water rights have also been identified.  
 
At a later stage, possible incentives for reliable and accountable irrigation services will 
be elaborated. 
 
Salt water agriculture 
Allocative water management may lead to the introduction of entirely new, 
innovative farming systems. In the project special attention will be paid to salt water 
farming systems. The coastal zone of the Krishna River estuary has been studied in 
more detail and existing and potential problems resulting from land and water 
management (upstream) in the catchment have been identified. Local stakeholders 
were involved and new concepts and development options have been discussed and 
assessed. 
 
 
1.5 Project organization 
The project was executed by a multidisciplinary team of Dutch experts from Alterra, 
LEI, PRI and WI, and Indian experts from ANGRAU and IWMI. The various 
activities were rationally distributed over the various institutes.  
 
The division of roles and responsibilities was: 
• Alterra: project management and expertise on planning & decision support in 
integrated water resource management, irrigation institutions, irrigation 
performance, remote sensing, holistic modelling, GIS. 
• LEI: water economy and water valuation, water institutions, water rights, 
incentives in water demand management. 
• PRI: farming systems in relation to water reliability, water productivity (in 
irrigated and rainfed agriculture), crop vulnerability to water (and salinity) 
stress, salt water farming systems 
• WI: multi-stakeholder processes, integrated coastal zone management. 
 
The partners in India involved in the project were: 
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• Acharya N.G. Ranga Agricultural University, Andhra Pradesh, India: Liaison 
with local organisations, modelling, GIS, surveys/data collection and 
processing, farming systems. 
• International Water Management Institute (Hyderabad). 
• Swaminathan Foundation: Stakeholder meetings, knowledge on restoration 
of coastal ecosystems. 
 
It is planned that a workshop is organised in India in 2007 to discusse the results and 
recommend on follow-up. 
 
 
1.6 Structure of this report 
The report is subdivided in 3 parts: 
• Part A: Introduction and rationale 
• Part B:  Referential framework (problem analysis) 
• Part C: Towards judicious land and water development and management in 
the Krishna River basin 
 
Chapter 2 starts with the rationale of allocative water management, its prospects and 
implications.  
 
As the focus of the project is on water allocation for irrigated agriculture and 
ecosystems, it was considered appropriate to study the development of irrigated 
agriculture in India, the problems that emerged, the interventions made, the 
perceptions and beliefs of the planners and designers, etc. Chapter 3 (Part B) 
presents an analysis of the objectives of the Indian irrigation sector and how these 
objectives evolved in time.  
 
In Part C the contributions by the various partners to the knowledge base on 
judicious land and water development and management are presented. As the 
financing of the project was rather unexpectedly interrupted these contributions have 
not yet been reviewed nor synergized. The information should, therefore, be 
considered as an initial knowledge base for further research. 
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2 Prospects and implications of allocative4 water management  
Herco Jansen5 
 
2.1 The need for allocative water management in the Krishna basin 
When dealing with increasing water scarcity, water management institutions, 
generally, show the following sequence of action6: 
 
1. Supply Management. Interventions by water managers are aimed at getting 
more water, which is mostly accomplished by water transfer and storage. 
Supply management generally implies (sometime large) infrastructural works, 
such as barrages, storage reservoirs, new irrigation schemes, supply canals, 
pipelines, pumping / booster stations, well fields / boreholes, etc. The goal 
of supply management is to get more drops (“get more water”) 
2. Demand management / end-use efficiency. Interventions are aimed at water 
saving technologies and strategies. The goal is to get more crop per drop 
(“do more with the water”). Improving end-use efficiency may imply technical 
interventions, such as efficient irrigation systems or crop varieties, 
constitutional interventions, such as the charging of water, institutional / 
management interventions (including training), aimed at better (agricultural) 
practices. 
3. Demand management / allocative efficiency. Interventions are aimed at the 
reallocation of water to water uses that generate a high value per unit of 
water. Improving allocative efficiency may imply the withdrawal of water 
rights from irrigation schemes that produce low revenues per unit of water. 
It, therefore, implies strategic decisions on water use. The goal is to get more 
jobs per drop (“do other/better things with the water”). 
 
 
Water management institutions generally prefer supply management as the first 
option, as water supply interventions are the easiest to implement and also cause the 
least social disruption.  However, the improved supply of water will also cause 
increased demand, which then results in a vicious cycle that again more water supply 
infrastructure will be needed, which obviously becomes more and more costly and 
more and more environmentally detrimental. As water is principally considered as a 
free good, emphasis on supply management also poses the risk that irrigation 
performance and the management needs do not receive due attention. 
 
                                                          
4  In the international literature the expression ‘adaptive water management’ is generally used. As 
adaptive water management has a broader scope, while ‘allocative water management’ focuses on 
the general water scarcity issue, the latter expression is used in this report.  
5  Alterra, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands 
6  See FAO, 2000; Turton, 1999; Snellen et al, 2005; and others 
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Water demand management can result in social and political stress. The introduction 
of water saving technologies is still relatively easy, but –for example- the charging of 
farmers for irrigation water is often declined. In India many farmers subsist in a 
rather marginal financial situation, which does not allow them to pay (substantially) 
for water7. The average landholding in India is only 1.57 ha (Ministry of Agriculture, 
1996), with 59% of the landholdings being less than 1 ha (data of 1990-1991).  
Another aspect is that the charging for water implies that the service-providers 
(Irrigation Department) become accountable for their services, which would entail 
additional obligations and a shift in their daily routines. 
 
In India the Irrigation Department has initiated some activities directed to water 
demand management, such as the introduction of organizational reforms (through 
Water Users Associations) and training programs. However, the emphasis of the 
Department is still on supply management, which is illustrated by various large 
infrastructural projects presently being planned or executed, including the 
construction of huge storage reservoirs and large inter-catchment water transfers.  
 
In almost the entire country there is no (clear) prioritization of water allocation in 
times of water shortages. In times of water scarcity the Irrigation Department 
envisages equitable distribution among the water users. This practice of “sharing the 
scarcity” results in low irrigation productivity, low yields, low cropping intensity and 
reduced opportunities for diversifying agriculture. 
 
Allocative water management may require that the present technical infrastructure, 
mode of operation and institutional framework be thoroughly adapted, however the 
main obstacle is that reallocation of water to the most productive water uses is 
socially and politically extremely complex. It may imply that the food needed by 
growing populations will need to be imported and paid for by the industry, the 
services sector and highly-productive agricultural enterprises that produce for the 
(world) market. Allocative water demand management will require social 
restructuring and entails risks of tension and conflicts within the country, within 
states, and between sectors and population groups with different stakes in a new 
socio-economic environment. 
 
Yet there is no doubt that the water authorities in India have to think and to work 
towards allocative water management strategies to ensure long-term judicious land 
and water development and management.  Allocative water management strategies 
offer great opportunities to significantly improve the water productivity in agriculture 
(by introducing alternative, more productive farming systems) and in other sectors. It 
also offers opportunities in combating environmental degradation and even in the 
reconstruction of degenerated natural resources. 
 
 
                                                          
7  Studies show, however, that for many farming systems the financial benefits of water are high, so 
that these farmers could easily bear water charging. Note also that if water benefits are very high 
then the effect of water charging as demand management measure is also limited. 
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2.2 Prospects of allocative water management for agricultural 
production 
Allocative water management implies prioritization in water allocation and the 
establishment of discriminate service levels for the different water uses.  Once that 
there is a service agreement between the water management organisation (Irrigation 
Department) and the (group of) farmers, farmers will optimize their farming system 
according to the service level of water supply (reliability of water supply). It is 
expected that farmers are prepared to run more risk and invest in more productive 
farming systems if the water supply is more reliable. Farmers will be prepared to 
select high yielding but water sensitive varieties, put more effort in land preparation, 
plant more intensively, and invest in high quality seeds, fertilisers and pesticides.  
 
Allocative water management can, therefore, result in a significant overall increase of 
the agricultural productivity. The gains from water reallocation can be immense if 
there are significant differences in the value per unit of water consumed across 
farming systems. For example, rice that receives an unreliable water supply rarely 
generates more than $0.025 per cubic meter of water, while horticultural crops that 
receive a very reliable supply may generate 100 times that value. In times of scarcity 
water would then be (firstly) directed to the horticultural farms. The horticultural 
farmers will have no problem to compensate the less productive rice farmers with 
(say) $0.2 if they can use all of the water, which would mean that both farmers are 
better off (Hellegers, 2006).  
 
At a larger scale (macro-scale) allocative water management envisages the same 
effect, i.e. higher revenues from agricultural production. This will be achieved if the 
increase in agricultural productivity from new, high-productive farming systems 
exceeds the decrease in productivity from the low-productive farming systems. 
 
 
2.3 Prospects of allocative water management for ecosystems 
The prioritization in water allocation and the establishment of service levels for water 
supply should be largely based on the value per unit of water used by the various 
farming systems. Once that these values are known, there is also good insight in the 
potential of restoration of ecosystems by abandoning low-productive (polluting) 
farming systems in areas with good ecological prospects or farming systems that 
impact on existing ecosystems.  
 
For example, in a situation that 80 percent of the farming systems only contribute 20 
% of the area’s revenues from agriculture, there would be a great potential for a 
change in land use, for example towards the development or rehabilitation of nature, 
which would also offer new prospects of economic development (e.g. tourism, 
fishery). 
 
Allocative water management may (should) eventually lead to a decrease of water use 
by agriculture, down to a long-term sustainability level. In such a situation water for 
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agriculture will only be allocated to high productive farming systems. The total 
revenues of these (limited number of) farming systems will exceed the present 
revenues from the agricultural sector.   
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3 The Indian irrigation sector’s objectives 8 
Bart Snellen9 
 
3.1 Irrigation reform in India 
There is a huge literature on institutional reform in irrigation, in India (e.g. Gulati et 
al, 2005: Institutional Reforms in Indian Irrigation, with more than 200 references) and 
elsewhere (e.g. www.inpim.org). As stated in a World Bank report on Institutional 
Reform Options in the Irrigation Sector, ‘in most cases the principal driving force for 
institutional reform is poor O&M and the inability of the government to mobilize 
funds, either directly or indirectly, for even deficient service provision’ (World Bank 
2004).  This is also the case in India: by the mid-1990’s, the revenue collected from 
water charges was less than 10 percent of the total O&M expenses (Gulati et al, 
2005, p.19). The principle solution prescribed is that of transferring management 
tasks from the irrigation agency to the users; this process is addressed as Irrigation 
Management Transfer (IMT) or Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM), the term 
used by the International Network on PIM, hence www.inpim.org.  
 
The literature on IMT/PIM suggests that the major problems in irrigation are 
institutional and therefore can be resolved through institutional reform. This paper 
argues that the irrigation sector in India faces three major and inter-related problems 
that may well originate from inappropriate institutional arrangements, but require 
more than institutional reforms to resolve: 
 
1. Too much land has been developed for perennial irrigation; there is not enough water 
to provide adequate irrigation services to the currently developed command 
areas; 
2. Irrigation infrastructure precludes productive use of water; current designs of large-
scale systems give managers no alternative but haphazard distribution of 
irrigation water and prevents irrigators from using water – both irrigation and 
rainwater! - effectively and efficiently; 
3. Irrigation professionals lack the attitude, knowledge, and skills to provide water services to 
agriculture and protect the land and water resources. 
 
Dealing with these problems requires a drastic reform of Indian irrigated agriculture 
that goes far beyond the institutional reforms advocated by many researchers in this 
field. A better understanding of the root causes of these problems is gained by 
looking into the history of irrigation development in India. The first section will 
focus on Northern India, the second on East India and the Krishna Basin.  
 
 
                                                          
8     The title as submitted by the author was “The Indian irrigation sector’s forgotten objectives” 
9  Alterra, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands 
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3.2 Irrigation development in Northern India 
3.2.1 General outline 
The first major study on the effect of colonial canal irrigation on agrarian conditions 
is by Elizabeth Whitcombe (1972). The introductory chapter describes the pattern of 
agriculture that existed at the time of the start of the works on the Ganges Canal in 
1847. It explains in great detail how farmers used crop diversification to reduce the 
risk of crop failure caused by inadequate rainfall (both shortage and excess): they 
would grow a variety of crops on different locations.  
 
The combination of a wide range of crops grown on a wide range of soils ensured 
that at least some crops would make it to harvest, even under the most adverse 
rainfall conditions. Farmers also practiced irrigation on a limited part of their land, 
using wells and small ponds in natural depressions that would fill with rainfall. 
Irrigation water generally needed to be lifted from the source, which required 
considerable labour and animal power. 
 
According to Whitcombe, the introduction of canal irrigation ‘caused pronounced 
environmental and economic disruption’ and also ‘disrupted the [farmers’] former 
pattern of work’: 
• production of food crops was downgraded in favour of commercial crops; 
this increased vulnerability of cultivators in dry years, when the canals – 
contrary to expectations – could do little to ‘decrease the ravages of [rainfall] 
scarcity’; 
• overcropping, due to ease of canal irrigation compared to wells, leading to 
disruption of fallowing cycles and loss of soil fertility; 
• canal irrigation attracted pastoral casts into crop cultivation, thereby reducing 
the availability of draught animals and manure, resulting in yield reduction; 
• waterlogging of low-lying land, due to turning large quantities of water over 
an almost slopeless plains landscape, worsened by water channels obstructing 
natural drainage; 
• saline deposits over land’s surface, due to capillary rise of salt-laden water 
from subsoil; 
• increase in malaria, due to expansion of mosquito breeding sites; 
• disruption of well irrigation, due to instability of earthen wells after increase 
in groundwater table. 
 
Whitcombe’s verdict about the negative impact of canal irrigation on the peasant 
community stirred economist Ian Stone into undertaking a comprehensive analysis 
(Stone 1984).  He finds that the adverse effects of canal irrigation have been greatly 
overstated and points out the positive effects of canal irrigation on the productivity 
of labour: ‘The spread of canal irrigation created labour shortages which led to the 
adoption of a chain of labour saving devices and which gave the highest possible 
returns to direct cultivation.’  
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3.2.2 Discussion: Whitcombe versus Stone 
A reviewer of Stone’s book raised the question why the study had taken so long (12 
years) and answered it himself: ‘Successful analysis depends on a detailed 
appreciation not only of the political history of the period and of the specific context 
in which irrigation development took place; it also demands a full appreciation of the 
geographical, economic and social systems which provided the context of that 
development’ (Bradnock 1986).   
 
What strikes me as missing in Bradnock’s list of important issues, is the agricultural 
context, which took such a prominent place in Whitcombe’s study and received 
hardly more than some footnotes in Stone’s publication. I think an important reason 
for Stone’s positive stance on canal irrigation is his lack of appreciation for the way 
farmers had adapted their cultivation practices to the conditions of erratic rainfall. 
 
This brings us to a key message of the present paper, which is that the primary 
purpose of irrigation is that of reducing farmers’ exposure to risks resulting from 
inadequate rainfall. The success of irrigation development should therefore be 
evaluated in terms of two criteria: 
1. The reduction of farmers risks from inadequate rainfall; 
2. The resources (both natural and capital!) employed to achieve this reduction. 
 
It is not easy to quantify these criteria in economic terms. Whitcombe perceived the 
shift towards commercial crops at the expense of food crops as an increased risk, 
because the chance of crop failure of the commercial crops – leaving the farmer 
without income and food - was much greater than the chance of not being able to 
harvest any of the food crops. But how to compare the value of an assured food 
supply with the value of a potentially higher but less secure income?  She was also 
concerned by the adverse effects of canal irrigation on the natural resource base; the 
loss of this natural capital comes on top of the investment cost, but calculating the 
loss involves more than simple arithmetic.  
 
Performance assessment is much easier when we adopt the indicator commonly used 
by the developers of canal irrigation in British India, which is based on: 
1. The increased revenue from land taxes and water charges; 
2. The capital invested in building the works. 
 
Table 1. Financial returns of major canals in the Doab (1895-1900) 
Canal Number of years 
in operation 
Area irrigated  
(1000 acres) 
Return on capital 
(%) 
Upper Ganges 46 949  9.5 
Lower Ganges 22 774  4.0 
Agra  26 228  5.6 
Eastern Jumna 70 286 26.6 
Source: Stone (1984) 
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Data on financial returns similar to those in Table 1 is available for all major 
irrigation works built in British India. By 1921, total capital investment in productive 
irrigation amounted to £ 57 million and the total command area to 57 million acres, 
producing an average return on capital of 9%.  The reputation of the chief engineers 
in charge of the early irrigation works depended largely on the financial results.  
Stone’s book contains an appendix with the career outlines of the most important 
engineers.  
 
It is not my intention to suggest that Stone has chosen the easier method of 
performance assessment out of convenience, nor that he has sided with the British 
engineers rather than with the Indian peasants. On the contrary, Stone has gone to 
great length to explore the reasons behind the choices made by the farmers, analysing 
the impact of canal irrigation on availability and use of labour, the issues of land tax, 
water charges and pricing of agricultural commodities. Stone’s book is very 
informative about farmers’ predicaments in dealing with merchants and canal 
irrigation operators. The chapter on the protection against famine also gives the story 
from both sides: the colonial administration as well as the local peasantry. 
 
Whitcombe versus Stone, therefore, is not about Indian peasants versus colonial 
rulers and irrigation engineers. Rather, it is about agriculture versus irrigation. Or 
more precisely: an interpretation of irrigation serving agriculture10 and the natural resource 
base on which it depends versus irrigation engineering serving a purpose of its own.  
 
In my view it is the second interpretation – irrigation mainly serving irrigation - that 
is the main cause of the abject condition of irrigated agriculture in India today.  A 
footnote on p. 225 of Stone’s book shows that this is by no means an original idea: 
 
‘Up to now, irrigation in India has been looked upon largely as an engineering 
problem.....but the real value of irrigation depends largely upon a proper appreciation of the 
needs of the crops irrigated.’ (Howard & Howard, 1917). 
 
Howard and his wife both worked as botanists at the Agricultural Research Institute 
in Pusa (Bihar), founded by Lord Curzon11 to promote scientific agriculture. The 
Howards studied the effects of rainfall and irrigation on soil structure and yields for 
various climates, soils, cropping patterns and practices. A main theme of their work 
was soil aeration, which they considered a neglected subject in India: 
 
‘The necessity for irrigation, the attention paid to dry farming methods and to water 
conservation, all tend to concentrate the attention of the investigator on questions related to 
water and, at the same time, to obscure the importance of the air supply to the roots…’ 
(Howard, 1953).   
 
                                                          
10  N.B. Serving agriculture here is more than contributing to income from agricultural production; it is 
also about understanding, using, respecting and maintaining the non-marketable part of the 
resource base on which agriculture depends: crops, soils, rainfall, as well as people. 
11  Governor General and Viceroy of India (1899-1905) 
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In one of their on-farm experiments, they found that land prepared with a spring-
tine cultivator and a single irrigation applied before sowing produced yields that were 
30% higher than those obtained with the traditional practice with 7 or 8 irrigation 
applications. On the basis of this type of results, the Howards called for an overhaul 
of the systems governing the use of irrigation water and its payment: 
 
‘The importance of this matter to India needs no argument..... It is true that the 
difficulties involved in overhauling a vast system of perennial irrigation 
constitutes a formidable undertaking.* On the other hand, if, as appears to be the 
case, much more can be made of the present water supplies, it is 
obviously to the advantage both of the cultivator and of the State that 
modifications should be introduced into the existing systems. The 
centre of the subject is the plant and the physiological processes 
involved in its growth. If perennial irrigation interferes with its growth, it 
will have to be modified.* The difficulty in making an advance in matters such as the 
improvement of an existing irrigation system is to begin. If the most is to be made of irrigation 
water, it is obvious that the cultivator must be a willing partner in the undertaking and that 
the water will have to be charged for according to the amount used.* At 
present [1917 !] the usual method in India is to levy a water-rate according to the area 
watered, a proceeding often condemned by members of the Irrigation Department itself.’ [* 
my emphasis] (Howard 1953). 
 
Sir Albert Howard is remembered as the founding father of Organic Farming12, not 
as the great reformer of irrigated agriculture in India.  His call of 1917 for an 
overhaul of India’s large-scale irrigation systems has not been acted upon and 
irrigation has continued ‘to be looked upon largely as an engineering problem’, until the 
present day. It seems justified to say that over the years, irrigation engineering, 
agriculture, nature and science have drifted apart even further. 
 
 
3.2.3 Nature, agriculture, irrigation and science 
It is not surprising that Sir Howard’s plea for an overhaul of the large-scale perennial 
irrigation systems fell on deaf ears:  
• It did not correspond with the world view of the British irrigation engineers, 
• It went against their immediate interest of expanding canal irrigation;  
• It would have required a totally different irrigation design (infrastructure and 
operational rules). 
 
 
World view 
 
The Howards applied their scientific insight in plant physiological processes 
interacting with the soil and atmosphere to improve local agricultural production. 
This was predominantly subsistence farming, with limited options for increasing the 
level of external inputs, especially inputs requiring cash. So the Howards developed a 
                                                          
12 http://journeytoforever.org/farm_library/howard_memorial.html 
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keen eye for agronomic practices that made beneficial use of the natural 
environment; the resulting world view could be described as ‘working with nature’. 
 
In contrast, the education of British engineers prepared them for ‘victorious success 
in subduing nature’ (Gilmartin 2003).  Development and expansion of canal irrigation 
provided engineers with the opportunity to win two victories over nature:  
1. harnessing and controlling the rivers 
2. subduing the monsoon.  
 
The engineers were actively engaged in the first battle: river engineering and canal 
construction.  This prepared the ground for the second battle – making the land 
productive irrespective of rainfall – where the engineers saw a limited role for 
themselves, leaving the initiative largely to the cultivators.  
 
Besides it being the more glorious part, in the early stages of irrigation development 
there were perfectly valid reasons for the British engineers to concentrate on river 
engineering and canal construction, rather than on distribution and application of 
irrigation water.  They had observed that the agricultural lands adjacent to rivers were 
more productive and the population more prosperous. Hence, it would suffice to 
divert some of the river water into an artificial river (called canal) for the cultivators to 
reap similar benefits. Also, especially in the more arid regions, there was no scarcity 
of land. This meant there was little point in making every effort to optimize 
agricultural productivity per unit of land.   
 
From the very start, irrigation engineers were encouraged to spread the canal water as 
thinly as possible, in order to maximize the size of the command area, thereby 
maximizing the potential revenue.  As a productivity index, the term ‘duty’ was 
introduced; it indicates the number of acres of cropped land that can be brought to 
maturity with one cubic foot per second (cusec) running continuously throughout 
the growing season. The duty was also used in calculating the required capacity of the 
irrigation canals. 
“Duty” was thus a fundamental measure of the ultimate goal of irrigation science – the 
extraction of productive capacity from water (Gilmartin 2003).  
 
Over time, profitability of canal irrigation gradually diminished and eventually turned 
from a source of income to the permanent drain of public funds that it is today.  The 
dramatic changes in profitability do not appear to have had much effect on the 
engineers’ world view, in the sense that until the present day there is still a strong 
preference for expanding canal irrigation. 
 
 
Expanding canal irrigation 
 
British canal-building activity in India started in 1817 in Northern India. The first 
schemes were mostly rehabilitated and extended versions of indigenous works. The 
first purely British work was the Ganges Canal, with 650 miles of main and branch 
lines, which took from 1836 to 1854 to complete and required an investment by the 
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government of £ 2.15 million. To enable implementation of even larger schemes, the 
hydraulic engineer Sir Arthur Cotton advocated commercial irrigation companies and 
financing through government-backed loans. This approach proved a costly 
experiment (see section below on Krishna river basin) and was abandoned in 1866.  
 
Since then, irrigation works were implemented by a public agency. An annual sum of 
around £ 0.5 million was earmarked for irrigation out of ordinary revenue. For 
expansion of canal irrigation, an additional sum of roughly £ 2 million per year could 
be obtained through loans from London, provided that the schemes could be 
expected to be ‘remunerative.’ The ‘productivity test’ required that the projects after 
10 years from their date of opening would yield an income equal to the interest on 
their construction cost (Stone 1984).  
 
Project revenue depended on water charges and land tax. The irrigation authorities, 
however, were very much constrained in setting water charges, as the Imperial 
administration also sought indirect returns from irrigation in terms of political stability 
and social welfare. As a result, water charges were very much lower than the value of 
the irrigation water to the producer. The policy of low water charges was another 
disincentive for the irrigation professionals to take an interest in the effects of 
irrigation on agricultural productivity. Instead, it added to their tendency of 
evaluating the effect of their work predominantly in terms of area brought under 
irrigation. This tendency was further boosted by Richard Strachey, Inspector-General 
of Irrigation during 1866-9, who announced a new policy aimed at ‘extending 
irrigation generally and so far as is possible in a manner that shall to the utmost guard 
against the worst effects of severe drought’.   
 
For Northern India, the ‘normal standard’ adopted in the 1870’s was that 42.5% of 
the cultivable area within a village should receive irrigation water. ‘In practice, the 
guidelines were impossible to adhere to, but the principle was clear; equity was to be 
an important guide in the establishment of the distribution system; as many villages 
as possible were to be served, with a view to maximizing protection rather than 
production.’ (Stone 1984) 
 
The pressure on the irrigation engineers to expand the irrigated areas may serve to 
explain their lack of interest in the agronomic experiments of the Howards. From the 
perspective of maximizing the ‘protected’ area, however, it is a pity the engineers 
have not listened: the experiments of the Howards not only indicated how to 
increase crop yield per unit of land, but also per unit of water. Taking up the advice 
of the Howards would have enabled the irrigation engineers to expand the irrigated 
area even further.  
 
Besides limited interest in agronomy, there are two more reasons that may explain 
why the irrigation engineers did not care much for Howards’ point of view: 
 
1. The Howards preferred rain water over canal water. This largely follows from 
the importance they attached to adequate soil aeration. They believed that 
rainfall contains more dissolved oxygen than canal water, which explains part 
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of their preference. The other part is their concern about the effect of over-
irrigation on soil aeration. Hence their recommendation to make optimal use 
of rainfall and reduce canal water applications. It is quite understandable that 
this message is not immediately appreciated by a profession that is founded 
on selling canal water. 
2. The irrigation infrastructure developed for the distribution of canal water was 
incompatible with the mode of operation suggested by the Howards. This 
aspect will be discussed in the next paragraph.    
 
 
Irrigation design 
 
The early irrigation projects built by the British consisted merely of an inlet from a 
river into an earth canal running parallel to that river and often ending in the same 
river from where it departed. The engineers’ main concern was to keep the canal 
stable. Having no previous experience with irrigation canals, this was mainly a matter 
of trial and error. Only in the last decades of the 19th century, the engineers 
developed mathematical formulas which allowed them to calculate the maximum 
allowable slope of the canals. These formulas were mainly based on empirical data, 
rather than on hydraulic theory.  
 
The canals carried water continuously, with variations in flow depending on water 
levels in the parent river. Hence, there was no relation between canal supply and 
irrigation demand; surplus supply would simply return to the river. This made perfect 
sense in the early stages of development, with abundant supply of river water and 
limited irrigation demand.  In spite of advances in hydraulic theory and infrastructure 
that provided more control over flow sizes, both at the headworks and at canal 
offtakes, the feature of continuous flow in the main canal remained. This was done 
in order to maintain a flow velocity that is high enough to prevent siltation. Again, 
this mode of operation can be quite efficient as long as there is not much variation in 
irrigation demand, as is the case in regions with negligible rainfall. 
 
It is not compatible, however, with a mode of operation that seeks to make 
maximum use of natural rainfall, as this would require a system that can cope with 
large fluctuations in irrigation demand. In addition, the suggestion of the Howards to 
charge water on a volumetric basis could not be followed-up; not only for lack of 
discharge measurement structures, but also because the distribution system did not 
offer the option of either storing surplus water and using it at another time or 
redirecting it to another place where it could be beneficially used.  The ‘overhaul of 
the perennial irrigation systems’ recommended by the Howards would indeed have 
required a complete revision of the irrigation design and operational practices.  
 
 
3.2.4 Discussion: Irrigation and its potential role in building social capital 
Elizabeth Whitcombe’s verdict was that canal irrigation ‘caused pronounced environmental 
and economic disruption’ and also ‘disrupted the [farmers’] former pattern of work’.  
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Sir Albert Howard complained that ‘irrigation in India has been looked upon largely as an 
engineering problem’.  
 
Stone contradicts Whitcombe and concludes that irrigation stimulated economic 
development.   
 
The above mentioned authors all wrote before the issue of Bruntland’s Report of 
1987 on Sustainable Development, which advocated economic development in 
harmony with social and environmental objectives.  In short, the need to balance the 
three E’s (Economics, Ecology, Equity) or three P’s (People, Planet, Profit).   
 
Reflecting this line of thought, the new field of ‘ecological economics’ aims at obtaining 
an optimal mix of man-made capital, natural capital and social capital. Another new 
specialized field is ‘institutional economics’, which besides the cost of production also 
considers the cost involved in making agreements – and living up to them - between 
economic actors.  In the field of natural resources management, the belief that 
science and technology provides the means to control nature has been replaced by 
‘adaptive management’:  as we now know that we cannot accurately predict the outcome 
of our interventions, we need to monitor their effects and be ready for taking 
corrective action.   
 
Howard criticized the builders of canal irrigation for paying too little attention to 
natural capital; Whitcombe evaluated the effects of canal irrigation on social capital 
from the point of view of diminishing natural capital; Stone regarded the shift from 
subsistence agriculture towards a market-orientation as positive, also in terms of 
contributing to social capital13. This difference of opinion shows that there are 
different criteria for valuation of social capital; perhaps as many as there are 
worldviews. 
 
Just like social and natural capital are not really new concepts, the same can be said 
of adaptive management: the early history of canal irrigation in India is very much one of 
building up experience through trial and error, or learning by doing.  What strikes me 
as most unfortunate is that this capacity for adaptation seems to have largely 
disappeared. Unfortunate too, is that this loss has occurred so early: in the 1870’s, 
when it became official policy in Northern India that 42.5 % of the cultivable area 
within a village should receive irrigation water.  Stone’s comments on this policy:  ‘In 
practice, the guidelines were impossible to adhere to, but the principle was clear; 
equity was to be an important guide in the establishment of the distribution system; 
as many villages as possible were to be served, with a view to maximizing protection 
rather than production’ (Stone 1984). 
 
Adaptive management requires monitoring of the effects of one’s actions, 
recognizing undesirable outcomes and taking corrective action. Imposing impossible 
guidelines on a group of professionals kills every incentive for a critical evaluation of 
the outcomes of one’s actions and for taking corrective action. If the situation is 
                                                          
13 This is perhaps best illustrated by Stone’s words: ‘irrigation was ‘absorbed’ according to the priorities and 
complexities of the peasant system.’ (p. 194) 
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allowed to continue, the professional has no option -apart from resigning from the 
job- than to learn how to cover up the gap between official policy and the actual 
results.  In stead of solving problems, he becomes apt at ignoring or hiding them.  
 
Stone, apparently, was less dismayed by the ‘impossible guidelines’ than I am, possibly 
because he found that at least ‘the principle was clear’ and ‘equity was to be an important 
guide’. In my perception, the equity principle was just as impossible to achieve in 
practice, for various reasons: 
 
1. Irrigation design 
Proportional distribution of incoming flow is technically relatively simple; it 
has been accomplished with local building materials in traditional irrigation 
systems that proved sustainable over centuries. The irrigation systems built by 
the British in Egypt also used the concept of proportional distribution. This 
functioned well enough until the introduction of the transportable diesel 
pump undermined an essential feature of the design. This feature was the 
need for cultivators of lifting the water from the distribution canals. Lifting 
was done by camel driven waterwheels, with limited pump capacity that 
became even smaller with falling canal water levels. Installation of 
waterwheels was subject to license. Equitable water distribution in the 
Egyptian systems was feasible, therefore, through an appropriate mix of  
hardware (proportional distribution in main canals, water level in distribution 
canals below field level, waterwheels with inbuilt capacity reduction under 
conditions of water scarcity) and software (licensing of lifting devices, 
policing against lifting without license).   
 
Canals in British India initially had to compete with irrigation wells. A major 
‘selling point’ of canal water was that it did not require lifting from the 
source. Hence, water level in the distribution canals was above field level. 
Irrigation engineers used hydraulic infrastructure that was based on 
proportional distribution, in the main canals as well as at the inlet of the 
distribution canals. Although these structures were made of concrete and 
steel, they were easily bypassed by digging through the embankment, 
rewarding the illicit digger instantly with a supply of water in excess of his 
proportional share.  
 
2. Social capital 
Traditional irrigation systems would rely on a combination of locally-made 
infrastructure that was effective in operation but not tamper-proof and social 
control for checking such tampering. In these systems, the software – or 
social capital – compensates the vulnerability of the hardware. The required 
social capital may result from past experiences with mutual assistance or from 
joint efforts in developing irrigation infrastructure.  
 
In British India, for a short time, the right to construct an outlet from the main canal 
was sold to any interested party, leaving the construction and operation of the water 
distribution to local initiative.  Rather than resulting in building up of social capital by 
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jointly building and operating of the infrastructure, this resulted in speculation – 
where the right to use the outlet was constantly transferred at a high premium – and 
gave ‘powerful rural elements an unduly pervasive and lasting influence over the 
manner in which water was distributed’ (Stone 1984). 
 
In an attempt to regain control, this practice was abandoned in the post 1860’s 
period, with the agency built irrigation system being extended to the village level.  
For reasons explained in the above paragraph, however, the hardware used was by 
no means tamper-proof. Moreover, the ‘powerful rural elements’ could simply 
redirect their influence and manipulate the water distribution at the village level.  
 
In conclusion, neither the hardware nor the software used in canal irrigation in India 
could realistically achieve equity in water distribution. Yet, equity has been upheld as 
a guiding principle and remains official policy until today. 
 
 
3.3 South and East India, Krishna Basin 
3.3.1 General outline 
Under colonial influence, water was diverted from its role in the survival economy 
and nature’s economy and was transformed into a source of revenue and taxes, or as 
an input to commodity production for the generation of profits. The introduction of 
market forces in the water economy of the country created new conflicts over water 
resources between the market and survival economies14. 
 
More than half of the total area under government-owned perennial canal irrigation 
in British India in 1945 was in the northwest, which is predominantly arid to semi-
arid. Another 25 percent was located in the wetter south (Kumar 1982). The 
relatively wetter conditions in the south provide better opportunities for rainfed 
agriculture and rainfall dependent water technologies.    
 
‘Large-scale water projects which work against nature’s water economy and people’s 
sustenance requirements have been designed by destroying water technologies which were 
ecologically more sustainable and socially more just.’ (Shiva 1991) 
 
Shiva describes different types of indigenous water harvesting and irrigation 
technologies, corresponding to variations in rainfall, soil and topographical 
conditions. Among them is the impressive tank system of South India, which has 
survived over centuries. It consists of several hundred and in some cases over a 
thousand reservoirs linked together. While Shiva states that in some regions ‘these 
tanks still play a central role in irrigation even today’, she also indicates that the 
‘immunity [against famine] was eroded following the deterioration of these irrigation 
works, which was primarily a consequence of breakdown in economic and social 
systems which ensured maintenance of the water systems.’  
 
                                                          
14 Source: Shiva, V. 1991. 
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In his account of irrigation developments in the Krishna Basin, Wallach says that 
when the British came into this part of India in the early 19th century, they ‘found a 
ravaged countryside’ with most of the indigenous irrigation works – however 
impressive - in ruins or on the verge of collapse. He gives accounts of pre-Raj 
famines, e.g. that of 1832 when ‘two-fifth’s of the people in the [Krishna] delta 
would perish with the failure of the monsoon.’ (Wallach 1985). 
 
 
3.3.2 Early success 
The British restored some of the ancient works as well as building new canal systems. 
Sir Arthur Cotton, after reconstructing systems at the mouth of the Cauvery and 
Godavary rivers, persuaded the East India Company to develop irrigation canals in 
the Krishna delta. As the Company was not sure whether the farmers -who were 
used to rainfed rice cultivation- would be willing to buy canal irrigation water, the 
command area was made about ten times larger than could be irrigated with the 
available supply. It turned out that canal irrigation was indeed welcomed by the 
farmers; by 1878 around 500,000 acres of paddy were irrigated, which was eventually 
doubled after a number of expansions of the system.  
 
The Indian Irrigation Commission of 1901-1903 wrote of Cotton’s delta projects that 
‘it would be difficult to find in any country three works of similar magnitude or cost 
which have conferred the same degree of benefit upon the people and the state’. 
(Cited in Wallach 1985). 
 
 
3.3.3 Early signs of trouble 
Cotton returned to England in 1855 because of ill-health but continued to promote 
canal irrigation; not only because he felt that ‘the sole cause of famine is the refusal 
to execute the works that will give us the use of the water that is at our disposal’ but 
also because he insisted that a network of navigation canals throughout India was a 
much more appropriate technology for India than railways. The canals would have 
dual functions and produce double profits.   
 
D’Sousa describes a scheme that Cotton managed to ‘sell’ to the East India Company 
in 1858. It combined navigation, irrigation and flood control in the Mahanadi delta 
(State of Orissa) and would yield a 30 percent return on investment (D’Sousa 2003). 
This time, however, the farmers had little interest in buying canal water; besides the 
delta’s high rainfall, the cultivators had access to various traditional irrigation sources.  
 
D’Sousa describes the colonial administrations moves aimed to ‘divorce the 
cultivators in the delta from ownership and access to their means and conditions of 
production, in order to then confront them with canal irrigation as a commodity 
subject to the market imperative.’ 
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These moves included: 
• Act III of 1876, which empowered the East India Company with the right to 
regulate the delta’s drainage. This enabled systematic destruction of small 
dams that cultivators would constructed to divert water from natural drains 
to their fields;  
• Construction of drains that destroyed farmers ponds and emptied small 
streams from which farmers used to collect water; 
• Alignment of irrigation canals in such a way that they would obstruct natural 
streams, which cultivators previously used for irrigation. 
 
According to D’Sousa it was clear that ‘the colonial administration sought to increase 
the spread of canal irrigation in the Orissa delta by forcibly foisting it upon a large 
number of cultivators.’  He gives a vivid account of violent disturbances, of farmers 
collectively resigning from their canal irrigation leases and petitioning to the 
Collector against the canals.   
 
The same author suggests another reason for the farmers not responding well to the 
scheme: the flood protection component interfered with farmers’ deliberate practice 
of diverting silt laden river floods to fertilize their land with the fine clay. He refers to 
Sir William Willcocks – another celebrated irrigation engineer of the British Empire – 
who argued that a system of overflow canals previously traversed India’s eastern 
deltas and irrigated vast stretches of land: it was a combination of the rich red water 
of the river and the rainfall that sustained the high agricultural output in the region 
for centuries prior to colonial rule. The deposition of silt, in addition to maintaining 
fertility also gradually raised the level of the flood plains, thereby providing a degree 
of protection against flooding.  
 
 
3.3.4 Discussion: Irrigation, imperialism and capitalism 
Elizabeth Whitcombe criticized the developers of canal irrigation in Northern India 
for disturbing the traditional practices by which the peasants protected themselves 
against the risks of inadequate rainfall.  
 
D’Sousa presents a case where a poorly functioning canal irrigation and flood 
protection system replaced a traditional system that had proved to be sustainable 
over centuries. In D’Sousa’s perception, this was not just the result of an over-
ambitious canal builder, but a typical example of capitalism transforming nature in 
order to make a profit.  
 
In a comparative study of British and Dutch colonialism, respectively in Burma and 
Indonesia, Furnivall (1956) concludes that capitalism was allowed to run more freely 
in Burma, whereas in Indonesia social constraints were imposed by the colonial 
government. Another major difference was that the Dutch kept most of the 
traditional social institutions, while the British brought all institutions under British 
law.  
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Willcocks’ remarks about the benefits of irrigation with silt laden water are confirmed 
by Dutch agronomist Den Berger, who investigated the effects of silt loads of 
irrigation water on soil fertility and rice yields (Berger 1915). The defense of his PhD 
thesis was held at the Technical University in Delft, because the Agricultural school 
in Wageningen did not have academic status at that time (1915).  
 
The thesis includes 12 propositions, two of which correspond with the 
recommendations made by Howard in the same year (refer to preceding 
section/chapter):  
• Proposition VIII: ‘The irrigation works in the Dutch Indies should be 
managed by agriculturists’.  
• Proposition IX: ‘It is recommended to collect irrigation fees from cultivators, 
local as well as European’. 
 
 
3.3.5 Developments after Independence  
 
‘Still, after the record of British failure, the government of India might have looked back at 
the British irrigation works and wondered at the obstinacy that led the Raj to continue 
building projects that were crippled the day they were finished.’  
‘India after 1947 did not ask these questions. The result was that no effort was made to 
prevent India from falling into a variation of the colonial trap. Instead of foreign masters who 
could not seek advice from villagers, India now developed a bureaucracy that was even more 
hierarchical and dismissive of the people it served.’ (Wallach 1985) 
 
The projects in the Krishna Basin that Wallach refers to are what he calls ‘high-
tension’ projects, which are designed to spread the available water thinly over a large 
area, in order to reach as many farmers as possible. This only works when each 
farmer takes less water than would be needed to cover the water requirements on all 
of his land. For Wallach, ‘the real culprit’ responsible for the ‘crippled’ projects referred 
to in the above quote, was ‘the weakness of the political institutions needed to ration water.’  
 
Wallach quotes N.V. Gadgil, who was the first minister of public works under Prime 
Minister Nehru and told the parliament in 1950: “the main problem of this country 
as everybody knows is that of food” and “unless irrigation facilities are increased a 
hundred fold the problem of food is not going to be solved.”   
 
In the Krishna River Basin, the area under irrigation increased about five fold, due to 
impressive works such as Nagarjunasagar, proudly advertised as ‘the world’s biggest 
masonry dam’.  Wallach comments: ‘The dams and canals are splendid monuments, 
but as water-distribution systems they are rarely able to deliver water to more than 
half of their commands, or service areas. The problem is partly an engineering one, 
with leaky, undersized canals; more fundamentally however, the problem is political, 
for the government is unable to prevent farmers at the upper or head ends of the 
distribution system from taking so much water that the tail end runs dry. Despite a 
decade of efforts of stopping this kind of irrigation abuse, there is much pessimism.’ 
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Wallach continues: ‘An irrigation engineer for FAO writes, “I have no suggested 
solution. It is becoming very difficult to live with any rational solution to water 
distribution.” Little has been published on the subject, perhaps because India has so 
much money, professional pride, and dreams of prosperity invested in the projects. 
Yet many irrigation engineers in India will admit privately that the waste of 
developmental funds is staggering. There is too much at stake for the problem to be 
tactfully ignored’ (Wallach 1984). 
 
 
3.3.6 Localization and Irrigated Wet & Irrigated Dry  
In 1984, the Government of Andhra Pradesh (GOAP) issued the Irrigation 
Utilization and Command Area Development (ICCAD) Act. It aims at spreading the 
benefits of irrigation as widely as possible.  Irrigated areas are classified as "Irrigated 
Wet" (IW) and "Irrigated Dry" (ID) under a procedure known as "Localization". In 
IW designated areas, all crops may be grown but farmers grow mostly rice and 
sugarcane. In ID designated areas (usually lighter soils), rice and sugarcane are 
specifically banned under the provisions of the 1984 Act because farmers in the canal 
head reaches would prevent water from reaching the tail-end areas. Section 24(2) of 
the 1984 Act allows GOAP to alter the Localization designation of an area if it 
wishes to advance the technology of land and water management practices. 
 
 
3.3.7 Andhra Pradesh Irrigation Project  
In 1986, the World Bank approved funding for the second Andhra Pradesh 
Irrigation Project (AP II) for an amount of about US $ 300 million. It included 
rehabilitation of 234 000 ha in the Srimasagar Project (SRSP) which was also to be 
extended by 34 000 ha, and new development of 65 000 ha served by the Srisailam 
Right Branch Canal (SRBC). New water management principles were to be 
introduced ‘to implement GOAP’s policy of equitable and cost-effective delivery of 
available water to a maximum number of beneficiaries’ (World Bank 1997).  All new 
and rehabilitated areas were designated as ID areas (see paragraph above) and would 
receive a reduced water supply. The project was cancelled in 1994, with only 52% of 
the budget spent. Its overall rating was highly unsatisfactory and the institutional 
development component negligible. AP II received the worst rating of 48 water 
resources projects in India in the World Bank portfolio in the period 1990-2000 
(Pitman 2002). 
 
In 1997, World Bank approved a US $ 150 million credit and US$ 175 million loan 
for AP III. The project would assist GOAP to complete the work started under AP 
II. The main stated project benefit of AP III was that ‘the project would reduce 
production variability and enable an increase in the production of high value crops 
estimated at about US $ 140 million per annum’ (World Bank 1997).  The Staff 
Appraisal Report (SAR) envisaged ‘significant shifts from low value to higher value 
crops as a result of rehabilitation works and expansion of reliable canal irrigation to 
the whole command’. The increase in average farm income was estimated to be 
360% in the new areas, 104 % in the rehabilitated areas and 197 % in the partially 
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completed areas. In spite of these huge expectations, the agricultural component of 
the project was only a mere 2.5 % of the total budget.  
 
 
3.3.8 Discussion 
As in the colonial era, the GOAP and the Irrigation Department are eager to expand 
irrigable area by building new canals, even though irrigation water in the existing 
systems hardly ever reaches the tail ends. The World Bank assists in making it 
plausible that the additional irrigation water needed for the expanded area can be 
obtained by simultaneously improving the productivity* and the efficiency* of water 
use in the existing command. If effective, this combination results in more value 
being produced with less water.   
 
This miracle can be accomplished if the large majority of farmers shift from rice to a 
less water demanding, higher value crop. The key to performing the miracle is more 
reliable irrigation services; this is perhaps best appreciated by comparing water 
management for rice cultivation with that of other crops. Rice is one of the few 
crops that tolerate – and sometimes even benefit from - submergence of their root 
system for a prolonged period of time. By simply maintaining a shallow layer of 
water in the field, farmers obtain optimal moisture conditions.  
 
More importantly, this water acts as an on-farm storage reservoir, which offers 
farmers a degree of protection against unreliable irrigation services or inadequate 
rainfall. Farmers will only be prepared to give up this insurance when they are fully 
convinced that they can rely on the irrigation agency to provide them with timely and 
sufficient irrigation water. In addition, farmers need to adopt other water 
management and cultivation practices: 
 
• Need for more irrigation ditches. When practicing rice cultivation with 
inundated fields, irrigation water can flow from field to field. If fields are not 
submerged, small irrigation channels are required to transport water. These 
channels take up land, which could otherwise be cultivated. This is even 
more problematic when farmers have to give up land for the construction of 
canals that distribute water to other farmers; 
• More effort in land preparation. Even distribution of irrigation water in a 
non-submerged field requires greater accuracy in land leveling and/or 
preparation of irrigation furrows or borders; 
• More difficult to assess adequacy of on-farm irrigation. In order to 
achieve optimal moisture conditions, farmers must apply a volume of 
irrigation water that is just adequate to replenish the rootzone of the plant to 
its maximum moisture holding capacity. Any excess volume applied will leach 
out nutrients, under-irrigation may lead to moisture deficiency before the 
next irrigation application is due.  
 
Farmers in AP generally do not have the means of knowing the moisture 
holding capacity of their field and the actual moisture content prior to 
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irrigation. This means they cannot know exactly how much irrigation water to 
apply. Even if they could calculate the required irrigation volume, they have 
no means of measuring it.  
 
The above doesn’t say the miracle cannot be performed; the message is that it would 
require enormous efforts from the irrigation agency as well as from the farmers. 
Even more importantly, the two sides would need to be fully committed to engage in 
a mutual trust building exercise. One might have expected that the World Bank 
would have insisted on firm evidence of this commitment as a condition for 
providing financial support. Especially since achieving the production increase 
predicted in the SAR entirely depends on achieving the shift in cropping pattern 
from rice to high value crops.  
 
The limited budget for the agricultural component and the fact that this component 
was only aimed at the farmers and not for giving agricultural education to irrigation 
engineers may suggest that this component was added just to give credibility to an 
extraordinary high estimate of agricultural production increase resulting from 
expansion of an irrigation system that is already facing water constraints.  
 
Apart from increasing agricultural production, the shift towards non-rice crops was 
also expected to free up water, thereby reducing the water constraints. As explained 
above, this shift will only occur when irrigation services become more reliable. Apart 
from rehabilitation works, the SAR for AP II does not mention any upgrading of 
main system operation by the irrigation department for achieving more reliable 
irrigation services. This is highly surprising, because without reliable water supplies at 
main system level, it is absolutely impossible to achieve adequate distribution among 
farmers. 
 
The Implementation Completion Report (ICR) for AP III became available in 
January 2005. The overall performance of the project was rated ‘satisfactory’, while 
the institutional development impact was rated as ‘modest’. Under the heading 
‘Agricultural Support Services’, the ICR states: ‘Overall performance is considered 
satisfactory in view of the good performance of the research and demonstration 
undertaken by Acharya N.G Ranga University (ANGRAU). A total of 2782 research 
trials and 1054 small and large-scale demonstrations were undertaken and a broad 
range of agronomic and water technologies developed.’  
 
ANGRAU has 41 research stations in the AP, many of them with their own 
irrigation facilities. This makes them independent from the functioning of large-scale 
public irrigation systems. Research trials conducted at those stations bear little- if any 
– relation with the problem of unreliable irrigation services in those public systems. 
The use of the term ‘agricultural support services’ again suggests that agriculture was 
not considered as the central objective of AP III.  
 
The Project Preparation & Monitoring Unit was reported to have ‘functioned 
satisfactorily providing timely information and reports. However, insufficient 
attention was given to independent project assessment and evaluation. The base-line 
survey, inordinately delayed and not completed until 2003, was based on secondary 
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sources of data for a single season’. In spite of these shortcomings in data collection, 
the ICR authors managed to calculate the Economic Rate of Return, which was 
claimed to be 14.7% at project closure.  The IRC provides tables showing an increase 
in the value of production, but does not discuss to what extent the shift from low to 
high value crops has taken place or whether irrigation services have become more 
reliable. It does mention that: ‘two consecutive years of drought in 2002 and 2003 
delayed release of water throughout the 65 000 ha command of SRBC, thereby 
delaying the project impact’. This information is given under the heading: ‘Factors 
outside the control of government or implementing agency.’ This brings up the 
question: “What is the point in investing in large-scale irrigation systems if they don’t protect 
farmers against inadequate rainfall?” 
 
In my view, the story of AP III confirms what is suggested in the title of this paper: 
that the irrigation sector seems to have forgotten what irrigation is all about.   
 
 
3.4 Towards a solution: Change the way we think about water and 
agriculture! 
‘Change the way we think about water and agriculture!’ is the first of 8 policy actions 
formulated by the Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture 
(Molden 2007). Instead of a narrow focus on rivers and groundwater, we should 
consider rain as the primary source of water. The implication is to give more 
attention to rainfed agriculture and supplementary irrigation. Resolving the problems 
in the Krishna basin requires a set of new paradigms to make agriculture regain its 
central place in irrigation development: 
• Redefine the purpose of  irrigation as reducing risks to farmers resulting from 
unreliable rainfall; 
• Recognize rainfall as the primary water resource and the landscape as a major 
factor determining how much of the rainfall can be ‘harvested’ for beneficial 
purposes; 
• Redefine the role of farmers from mere users of water, to ‘processors of 
rainfall’ whose actions have a large impact on water security in the river 
basin; 
• Recognize the  primary responsibility of agricultural engineers for developing 
solutions that provide basic food and water security through exploring the 
potential of ‘green infrastructure’ options, using their insights in interactions 
between rainfall,  landscape, cropping patterns, agronomic practices and 
terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems in the river basin; 
• Recognize the primary responsibility of civil engineers for developing ‘hard 
infrastructure’ for two main purposes: 1. Supplementing deficiencies of 
‘green infrastructure’ in providing basic food and water security, and 2. 
Maximizing productive use of the water that remains after basic needs have 
been met.  
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4 Rethinking irrigation 
Bart Snellen15 
 
Preface 
This chapter is aimed at providing some solutions to the problems presented in 
Chapter 3. It is not specific for India and can, therefore also be seen as a supplement 
to the chapter on irrigation in The Value of Rain (Alterra-report 1325, 2006).  
 
As I was working on this paper, IWMI published the report: Water for food, Water for 
life, which is the outcome of a 5 year international research project (Comprehensive 
Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture, CA), which involved some 700 
researchers. The summary report gives 8 policy actions. The first one is: 
 
Change the way we think about water and agriculture.  
 
Some quotes from the CA report: 
• ‘It is time to abandon the obsolete divide between irrigated and rainfed 
agriculture. In the new policy approach rainfall will be acknowledged as the 
key freshwater resource.’ (p.19) 
• ‘We need to consider agriculture as an ecosystem and to recognize the 
importance of preserving the natural resource base on which agricultural 
productivity rests’. (p.19) 
 
The recommendations of the CA seem to correspond largely with the ideas that I 
presented in The Value of Rain and the conclusions of Chapter 3. The CA report also 
has a chapter entitled Reinventing Irrigation. 
 
The CA was, however, issued at the time of this report. It was considered 
appropriate to analyze the CA before presenting the final version of this chapter. The 
working draft of this chapter has, however, been distribute to a limited group of 
readers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15  Alterra, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands 
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5 Scope for improvement of overall water benefits by allocative 
water management 
Petra Hellegers16 
 
5.1 General outline 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a methodology that is capable of assessing 
the private economic impacts of redistributing water. To illustrate how the 
methodology works, the Musi catchment, a sub basin of the Krishna River, is used as 
case study. 
 
This chapter and the case are based on work done by Davidson et al. (2007). It is 
important to note that the analysis is based in part on information about farm input 
prices, crop yields and market values - all of which vary from season to season - but 
the sample data used just serve to highlight underlying issues. Problems are not 
resolved in this chapter. Rather, aspects of a methodology through which these 
problems could be addressed are presented (Section 5.2). In Section 5.3 the 
implications of water reallocation between competing claims in the Musi catchment 
are assessed to show whether there is scope for improving the overall benefits from 
water reallocation among the major water user. In Section 5.4 the potential role that 
water valuation can play in assessing the gains from more reliable water supply is 
discussed.  
 
 
5.2 Methodology to assess the private economic impacts of 
redistributing water 
To an economist it is important to measure the benefits that can be derived from 
controlling water, while accounting for the costs of undertaking such an act. 
Hopefully, but not necessarily, the benefits of such an act will outweigh the costs. 
 
Two important and related economic elements need to be stressed.  First, water is an 
input to a production process.  If one is to assess the benefits of controlling water, 
then it is imperative to value the outputs or uses that are derived from water, not 
necessarily the water itself.  Second, given that water is combined with other inputs 
to produce outputs, it is also imperative that the value that water adds to the outputs 
is determined separately. 
 
In this study the aim is to measure the private economic effects of changing the 
distribution of water. What are measured are the economic surplus changes that 
result from changing what water is used for (see Figure 1). The supply and demand 
                                                          
16   Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) , P.O. Box 29703, 2502 LS The Hague, 
Netherlands 
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schedules represent the marginal cost and benefits (respectively) from water used to 
produce outputs in an economic system.  Economic surplus is the value producers 
and consumers derive from the production and consumption of a good, above what 
they would pay for that production.  It is equivalent to the area between the supply 
and demand schedules over the range of the quantity produced (see Figure 1).  Any 
change to the regulation of water flows will result in the marginal cost curve shifting 
(from S1 towards S2): outward, in the case of more water being made available for the 
production of the good in question, or shifting towards the origin in the case of 
water being restricted from a production process. Any change in the marginal cost 
curve will change the area of economic surplus.  It can be assumed that the marginal 
cost curve is perfectly elastic (or horizontal at the price level in Figure 1) if only small 
changes are made to the distribution of water. It is this welfare change that 
economists prefer to measure (Sinden and Thampapillai, 1995). 
 
What is measured here is the economic impact of changing the way water is 
controlled in the Musi. Of interest is the cost to agricultural producers along the 
Krishna River, and the benefit to domestic and industrial users in Hyderabad and 
agricultural producers downstream of Hyderabad.  
 
 
CS before redistribution: acP1   CS before redistribution: efP1 
CS after redistribution: abP2    CS after redistribution: egP2  
∆CS = area P2bcP1 (loss)   ∆CS = area P1fgP2 (gain) 
Rs/m3 = ∆CS/(Q1-Q2)    Rs/m3 = ∆CS/(Q2-Q1)   
Figure 1. Economic values to be measured 
 
For more details on the general approach to modelling the whole Krishna basin see 
Davidson et al. (2006). While the whole basin needs to be modelled from a social 
perspective, the private costs and benefits of redistributing water around the Musi 
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basin can be assessed initially and separately.  In undertaking this task what is 
modelled is the impact of moving water from one part of the basin to another, from 
the perspective of those who lose and those who gain from any redistribution.  
 
 
The Hydrological component 
Details of the hydrological model are presented in George, et al. (forthcoming). In 
this model the hydrological effects of changing the distribution of water amongst 
agriculture, domestic and industrial sectors is assessed. In particular, in the simulation 
that is undertaken water is redistributed away from the agricultural zone serviced by 
the left bank canal of the Nagarjuna Sagar and sent to supply the domestic and 
industrial sectors in Hyderabad, with concomitant flow on effects on the agricultural 
zone downstream from the city, known as the wastewater irrigated area.  It is further 
that 80% of the water received by the city flows to the wastewater irrigated area. In 
addition, 20% of the water that leaves the original source is lost before it arrives in 
Hyderabad. Finally, the year analysed is 2002-03, a very dry year and one in which 
producers did not receive their full entitlements of water.    
 
 
Costs of supplying water in the system 
The costs of supplying water from various supply points to Hyderabad City range 
from 3 Rs/m3 from reservoirs close to the city to 18 Rs/m3 for water from the 
Krishna River.  It should be noted that as the supply system has grown, the costs of 
supplying water to Hyderabad have increased.  Of interest in this study are the costs 
of accessing water from the Krishna River. It is assumed that the costs of accessing 
extra water from this source remain constant at 18 Rs/m3. The implicit assumption 
in using this figure is that the costs of distributing water under the current regime are 
non existent. 
 
Benefits 
The benefits from water are derived by those who use it.  In this basin those users 
can be segregated into domestic and industrial consumers based in Hyderabad City 
and agricultural producers. Details of the consumption of water throughout the basin 
and the benefits derived from it are detailed in Table 1. It should be remembered 
that as water is only one of numerous inputs into a production process  it is 
necessary to only account for the benefits water adds to that process, not the totality 
of the benefits from that process. 
 
Table 2.  The Quantity of Water Demanded and the Values Derived from its Use 2002-03 
Item      Water Qty Consumer surplus 
       (m3 million) (Rs. million) 
Agricultural users 976 1,102,050 
Domestic users 181      37,235 
Industrial users   42          972 
Wastewater Agricultural Users 179            47       
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Agricultural water use 
The benefits of irrigation water must be estimated, since it is seldom the case that 
farmers bid for water under competitive market conditions involving other economic 
sectors. The value of irrigation water is assumed to be the net income received by the 
farmer per unit of water.  
 
By far the greatest user of water in the Musi basin is agriculture. Individual input 
demand equations for water can be derived for each major crop, using a spreadsheet 
model designed by Perry (pers. Comm. IMWI, 2006). The model provides a simple 
framework for collecting data related to farm incomes, water and labour use and 
automatically computes indicative returns to land, labour and water. By subtracting 
the cost of other production factors from the gross production value, the net value 
added per unit water can be calculated (see Appendix 1).  
 
It is possible to obtain a partial budget of a farm given: the area farmed and the 
cropping pattern; the quantities of all inputs (labour, surface water supplies, fertilizers 
and pesticides); the yields of all crops produced and their respective 
evapotranspiration rates; and the prices of all inputs and outputs. From this base, the 
average values of all inputs, including that for water, are derived. The input data 
needed to work each spreadsheet for each zone was derived from the District 
Handbook of the various regions (Government of Andhra Pradesh 2005). 
 
It is important to note that such returns to water are difficult to compute precisely in 
the absence of a major modelling exercise, as the precise technical coefficients 
(yield/ha, water use, etc.) will vary across farms and by year. In addition, production 
costs are generally difficult to obtain and standard costs of production will not reflect 
variations among farmers. Besides that, some inputs are difficult to capture 
accurately because they are not monetised (like family labour), or may be subject to 
distortions due to taxes or subsidies (market prices often differ from economic prices 
due to price policies). Finally, the costs of fixed assets are not considered, as it is hard 
to translate financial costs of production into the economic costs.  
 
The question is how farmers will respond to less water availability. Vinod (pers. 
comm, IMWI, 2006) argues that during a period of severe water shortage in 2004, 
farmers in the Nagarjuna Sagar command areas received limited quantities of water 
from the dam.  Farmers reacted by not cultivating their fields.  If they did anything, 
they put in a dry crop.  As a consequence, it was decided to allow the area planted to 
adjust to changes in water distributions in the model.   
 
Domestic water use 
For domestic consumers water is a necessity of life. As such, the value of water to 
these consumers is incalculable. The own price elasticity of demand is assumed to be 
highly inelastic (at -0.1) and that any further provision beyond what is currently 
supplied would be consumed and valued more greatly than by any other user group. 
Thus water for domestic consumption is valued using an opportunity cost approach, 
where the price is assumed to be marginally greater than the next highest users’ value 
of that same quantity of water.   
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Industrial water use 
Hyderabad City is a large and growing industrial centre. What is not known are the 
quantities taken by individual industries (Van Rooijen, et al, 2005).  In valuing the 
economic surplus by the industrial sector an elasticity of demand for water by 
industries is needed.  Kumar (2006) estimates the own price elasticity of demand for 
water by various industries in India to be -0.902.  Using this elasticity and the supply 
price to the industrial sector (of Rs. 35/m3), the economic surplus is estimated to be 
Rs.42 million. 
 
 
5.3 Competing claims and water valuation in the Musi catchment of 
the Krishna Basin 
The Musi catchment is a mature water market, as to meet the increasing demand for 
water from domestic and industrial use in the city of Hyderabad water has to be 
diverted away from agriculture. What makes this Musi Catchment interesting is that 
farmers use wastewater from the city, complete with its nutrient pollutants, to irrigate 
crops. It is hard to think of a solution in the basin in which agriculture is not 
affected. Supplying more water to Hyderabad increases the amount available in a 
downstream wastewater irrigation scheme, but also reduces the amount of water 
available to irrigators elsewhere in the system.  
 
To ascertain the usefulness of our methodology the impacts of implementing what is 
known as Stage II and III of the Krishna River Project is simulated.  Under Stage II 
of the Project 85 m3 million is diverted from irrigators situated on the left bank of 
the Nagarjuna Sagar to Hyderabad.  This has a flow on effect to farmers in the 
wastewater area.  Under Stage III 159.6 m3 million is redistributed in a similar 
manner.  It should be noted that the cost of undertaking this redistribution is 
Rs18/m3.  This cost only includes the private costs of transferring the water (not the 
full social costs).  Similarly, only the private benefits derived from this transfer are 
determined.  The results of these transfers are presented in Table 3. 
 
It can be concluded that the simulations worked as expected. Producers in the 
Nagarjuna Sagar Left Bank lose somewhere in the order of Rs.3973 million in Stage 
II of the project and Rs.6245 million in Stage III, while those in the wastewater area 
gain approximately Rs.0.04 million and Rs.0.06 million with each increase in water 
diverted from the Krishna River.   
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Domestic and industrial consumers in Hyderabad gain Rs.46,048 million and Rs. 
108,342 million from Stage II and III, respectively.  The benefits of the diversions 
outweigh the costs from any diversion, to the order of Rs.40,541 million with stage II 
and Rs.99,225 million with Stage III.    
 
Table 3. Private Costs and Benefits from Redistributing Water from Nagarjuna Sagar under Stages II and III of 
the Krishna River project    
Item    Units   Stage II  Stage III 
 
  
Water reallocated  m3 million      85.2       159.6 
 
Agricultural users losses Rs.million               3973        6245 
Domestic users gains  Rs.million  45,482    107,160 
Industrial users gains  Rs.million      566        1182 
Wastewater Agri. Gains Rs.million     0.04         0.06 
Cost of diversion  Rs.million    1533        2872 
Net returns   Rs.million  40,541      99,225 
 
Given this outcome it could be concluded that it is in the interests of the state to 
undertake Stages II and III of the Krishna River project, from a purely private 
perspective.  The costs of redistributing water under the existing system are not 
currently accounted for in the analysis. These need and will be included in future 
work and would involve an extensive social benefit costs analysis.  Despite this 
deficiency, it can be concluded that the costs of delivering and distributing the water, 
along with any negative externalities that arise from using the wastewater, would 
need to be less than the net benefits calculated above, if Stage II and III are judged to 
be viable from a social perspective. So, although the results would lead one to 
conclude that such a project is worthwhile, such a conclusion could be considered to 
be premature. To understand the full ramifications of this project a more complete 
social Benefit Cost analysis would need to be undertaken. The analysis reported in 
this chapter could be used as a central component of any more detailed work. 
 
 
5.4 Valuation and reliability of water supply 
Special attention will be paid in this section to the relationship between reliability of 
water availability and productivity of water, as it has implications for the water 
required to meet specific levels of production and the design and management of the 
irrigation system.  
 
Water availability can be unreliable in terms of three parameters: rate of supply, 
duration of supply and periodicity between successive deliveries. While there has 
been extensive research in the impact on actual yield of variations in water 
availability, little is known about the impact on farmer behaviour of his ex ante 
expectations of variation in water availability.  
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It is likely that the farmer will be ready to invest more in a chosen crop if the 
availability of water is more secure: he will be ready to select high yielding but water 
sensitive varies, prepare the land carefully, plant intensively, and invest in high quality 
seeds, fertilisers and pesticides. It is therefore interesting to derive the value of 
reliability of water delivery. It is likely that returns to water - with a rather reliable 
supply - are higher than returns to water with a rather unreliable supply.  
 
Insight into differences in the water productivity of water –both in terms of the 
agricultural yield per unit of water consumed as well as in terms of the net 
agricultural production value per unit water consumed- among various farming 
systems will enable us to assess the benefits from more reliable water supply.  The 
gains from reallocation can be immense when there are significant differences in the 
value per unit of water consumed across farming systems. For example, a farming 
system that receives an unreliable water supply may generates not more than $0.05 
per cubic meter of water, while a farming system that receive a very reliable supply 
may generate more than twice that value. This means that farmers will be willing to 
pay for a more reliable supply of water.  
 
To achieve more reliable water supply and improve water allocation, changes in laws 
and institutions governing water use and allocation are required. 
 
Estimating returns to irrigation water for different farming systems enables us to 
assess the benefits from more reliable water supply. One representative Perry 
spreadsheet has to be made for each farming system. The minimum data requirement 
to make such a spreadsheet for each farming system is: 
 
• Area of each crop farmed 
• Yields from each crop 
• Output prices for each crop (not the ones received by the farmers, but the 
shadow prices received in the market, less the implicit tax) 
• Prices for each input (once again net of any subsidies received). 
• Labour requirements, though the model will work without them. 
• Monthly surface water requirements available in each zone. 
• Fertilizer application rates 
• Surface water supplies 
• Reliability of water supply 
 
However, no primary data have been collected so far for the different farming 
systems in the Krishna Basin, which is required to assess differences in water 
productivity (returns to water) due to reliability in availability, for the various farming 
system. 
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5.5 Remarks 
The purpose of this chapter was to present a methodology that is capable of 
assessing the private benefits and costs of distributing water within a catchment. 
Given that water distribution schemes involve massive public investment, a more 
ideal model would be based on a social benefit cost methodology. In India the prices 
of inputs, such as water and fertilizer are subsidised, while outputs tend to be taxed 
implicitly through a set of low procurement prices (Gulati and Narayanan 2003). In a 
social benefit cost analysis these effects would need to be accounted for and taken 
out of the analysis. As in this chapter we only aim to illustrate the methodology only 
private benefits are assessed. Any cultural and/or environmental impacts have also 
been ignored, but should be considered ideally. Finally, given that water has both a 
spatial and a temporal element to it, an ideal model must be capable of assessing the 
impacts changes may have on diverse regions at different times.  In this chapter the 
first step towards that type of model is made.   
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6 Scope for improvement of agricultural benefits by allocative 
water management 
Prem S. Bindraban17, M. Devender Reddy18, Senthilkumar Kalimuthu19 
 
6.1 General outline 
Agriculture is by far the largest user of water ranging from over 90% of water 
withdrawal from natural systems in various developing countries in the semi-arid 
regions, to some 50% in highly industrialized nations. The use efficiency in 
agriculture of water is rather low, as a small fraction of both irrigated water and rain 
water only is actually used as transpiration, i.e. the actual physiological process in 
crop growth. Largest amounts of water would therefore be saved as a means to 
resolve water scarcity problems by raising the use efficiency of water in agriculture 
(Molden et al., 2007). 
 
A range of agronomic practices can be introduce at the field scale to improve the 
water use efficiency, some of which will be briefly introduced in this section. In 
Hyderabad in particular, rice is a major crop that uses excessive amounts of water per 
kilogram of rice produced. Research has shown that water use can be reduced by half 
without penalty on rice yields at the field scale. 
 
Whether farmers will adopt or adapt the management practices associated with 
water-saving rice depends very much on an array of factors internal and external to 
the farm household. Internal factors are under the control of the farmer, while 
external factors are imposed on his/her farm household activities. The many small-
holders in Hyderabad develop their specific systems to deal with their environmental 
diversity by matching crops, crop mixtures and animal to the variations in the 
immediate biophysical environment and the reliability of resource supply such as 
water. In addition, socio-economic, institutional and cultural factors such as 
educational level, family circumstance, communal use or private land rights, and 
distance from the household to the market further shape the characteristics of the 
farming system. Increasingly, income is generated through off-farm employment as 
revenues from agricultural activities are decreasing due to overall decline of food 
prices. Therefore, many different forms of farming systems may develop even within 
short distances. Adoption by farmers of the new management practiced will 
therefore depend on total package of on- and off-farm activities, farm size, irrigation 
source, water and labour availability, use of other inputs and knowledge of the new 
technologies. Comprehensive understanding of factors affecting farm livelihood is 
hence needed to support the adoption process. It is for this reason that options to 
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enhance water productivity should be developed in the view of the entire farming 
system (e.g. Bindraban, 2006; Langeveld et al., 2005). 
 
Scope for water saving practices should be looked for in the context of enhancing 
farm livelihood. Options might include incremental adjustments, i.e. single and 
relatively simple changes to the existing systems, or entirely new approaches that 
might alter and affect a range of activities at the farm and in the household. 
Indications of some of these options will be described only briefly, as the research to 
classify farm households is still on-going. 
 
 
6.2 Backgrounds of low water productivity in the agricultural sector 
In his essay “The Tragedy of the Commons” Hardin (1968) claims that farmers are 
not concern about the “commons”, i.e. resources that are shared by a group of 
people. Every individual is using as much as possible of the commonly available 
resources to maximize profit. This is especially true for a fluid resource like water 
that is not strictly allocated to individuals such as land. This strategy may have 
unfavourable consequences for others and might eventually negatively affect 
themselves. When the reliance for natural resources is high, as is the case for the 
resource poor farming community in Hyderabad, resources will be allocated such as 
to secure livelihood at the short term, which in the long term may turn out to be 
unsustainable. Incentives to use natural resources more efficiently should therefore 
not emphasize the resource itself but associated factors such as total income, 
opportunities to diversity income, risks associated with current and alternative 
practices etc. Classification of farming systems is a first step in identifying entry 
points as to how new technologies and approaches can be successfully embedded in 
farming systems.  
 
Farm households that rely on a limited resource base are facing various challenges at 
the same time. The small land area does not allow much diversification and any 
failure to properly manage the production system creates high and unacceptable 
risks, which may lead to risk aversion, little abilities to engage in loans for 
investment, and inability to adopt new and unknown practices, no matter how 
innovative. 
 
The reliance on rainfall for instance is high, but the low and erratic nature of the 
monsoons in this tropical semi-arid zones leads to moisture deficit for crop 
production. While farmers do receive irrigation water, they have little control over its 
availability as irrigation boards are responsible for the supply of water from 
reservoirs. The reliance on water is further jeopardizes because of the decreasing 
groundwater level from 5-10 meters below soils surface some two decades ago to 
almost 60-100 meters to date in some regions (REF?). The deficient and 
uncontrolled availability of water entails high risk to crop failure which in turn 
hampers investments. The resulting low productivity and high vulnerability of 
farmers who have to cope also with decreasing prices of basic food items, such as 
rice, place them in a difficult situation to escape poverty (Brugere and Lingard, 2002; 
Ellis, 1988; English, 1990). 
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One of the means for farmers to minimize risk of crop failure is to over-irrigate their 
crops, particularly if water for irrigation is available free of charge. The high 
inefficiency of water use is obvious; over-irrigation of e.g. rice fields upon delivery 
through the canal for irrigation leads to inefficient water use in the head of the 
irrigation canal and water deficit to the farmers at the tail end. Barret and Skogerboe 
(1980) demonstrated that doing so was economically safer, although potentially 
leading to problems of water theft and conflicts over the use of common resource. It 
is understandable therefore that under moisture deficit condition the common 
interest among farmers to utilize the available natural resources more effectively 
within the community is hard to realize because of experienced risk and uncertainty 
to the individual. 
 
 
6.3 Farming systems and water reliability 
Agricultural holdings in India are generally small and fragmented with tiny plots 
scattered over the village. The size of the small holding is even further decreasing 
because of increasing population, inheritance laws and a decline in joint family 
systems. The total number of small holdings in India increased from 71 million in 
1970 to 106 million in 1990 whereas the area remained almost the same, marginally 
increasing from 162 to 166 million hectares in that same period. A substantial 
proportion of the small holdings are marginal farm households with less than 1 
hectare. Together with the medium farms with 1-4 hectares, they account for almost 
60% of the farms. The number of large farms with more than 10 hectares declined 
from 3 million in 1970 to 1.6 million in 1990 with total area declining from 50 to 29 
million hectares. 
 
There is a strong relation between farm size and agricultural activities undertaken. 
Small farms prioritize food self sufficiency, which allows the growth of cash crop 
only when subsistence needs are met. Larger farms can therefore devote larger areas 
to cash crops. The reliance on natural, social and economic resources differ between 
the farms which result in different responses to changes in internal and external 
factors. On the one hand, the need for minimizing risk calls for diversification, on 
the other hand, the cultivation of some crops may be very persistent. The persistence 
of millet in dry regions should be explained from risk minimization point to view to 
secure food availability. In other occasions rice cultivation is maintained by farmers 
that convert their inundated rice cultivation to dry crops like banana and sugarcane, 
because of the cultural desire to produce your own rice. The activities also depend on 
socio-economic aspects such as land ownership, literacy rate of farmers to adapt and 
adopt new technologies, prices of commodities etc. 
 
Farm typologies are a means of categorization, which enables to organize the wide 
diversity of actual farm households from a perspective relevant to the objectives of 
the study that is being undertaken.  Farm types are then inferred from the sampled 
farm characteristics, generally by multivariate analysis and clustering techniques 
(Durvernoy, 2000). So far no adequate method has been developed to quickly 
identify the farms of a study area and the type to which they belong for assessing the 
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proportion and distribution of each farm type. In different regions in the world farm 
have been grouped based on varying criteria such as land cover of a farm 
(Durvernoy, 2000), area of the various crops per farm and the availability of time and 
equipment (Leenhardt and Lemaire, 2001) and, mode of survival and survival 
strategies (Daskalopoulou and Petrou, 2002). 
 
The approach that will be pursued in this study is to categories farms holistically by 
considering the farm variables which have been observed in the explorative survey. A 
questionnaire has been developed to collect farm data that will allow analyses for 
addressing pre-determined objectives. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2. 
 
Not all the parameters collected through the questionnaire may necessarily have to 
be included in the analysis for typifying farms. Generally, farmers in a region do 
follow some similar management practices, such as the level of fertilizer application 
or use of pesticides because they following recommendation from State agricultural 
departments. These parameters could show little variation and may be disregarded, 
however only after a preliminary statistical control. Secondly, high correlation may 
exist between parameters due to their high interdependence, such as the number of 
animals in the farm and the application amount organic manure, which justifies 
exclusion of one variable in the further analysis of the farm typology. Then only the 
variables with a high variation among the farm households would be considered for 
farm typology. 
 
The data sets should be analyzed statistically (e.g. using the statistical package Canoco 
for windows version 4.5) through the Principal Components Analysis (PCA) (Ref to 
be added). PCA is an exploratory data analysis with the aim to summarize 
multivariate data in a convenient way. Data are arranged in a two-way table with rows 
representing farms and columns representing descriptive variables. PCA transforms a 
number of correlated variables into a smaller number of uncorrelated variables called 
principal components. By displaying the results in scatter diagrams, a better 
understanding is reached about the relations between farms and descriptive variables. 
In short, PCA reduces the dimensionality of the data set and to identify new 
meaningful underlying variables. Before employing PCA, the descriptive variables 
have to be standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard 
deviation. 
 
Roughly three categories of farm households can be distinguished (e.g. Rufino et al., 
in prep). A first group is marginal farmers that generate much of their income 
through off-farm employment activities. These farmers can hardly afford 
investments and run low-investment with little incentive and opportunities to 
innovate their farm activities. A most common strategy is to exit from agriculture 
and to become fully engage outside agriculture. A second group concerns large 
farmers that may live in near-by villages or cities and do not run the day-to-day 
operations, but remotely manage their farming activities. These farmers often have 
other income sources as well which reduces their reliance on agriculture. This allows 
them to adapt and adopt new options to improve their farm activities and increase 
their profit margins, making them innovative and entrepreneurial managers. A third 
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group concern farmers in between these two groups. Their reliance on farming is 
high with low off-farm income as they are fully engaged in farm activities. These are 
most vulnerable groups because of their strong dependence on the limited and 
uncertain bio-physical resource, their fluctuating income as a result of market 
developments and price instability, etc. 
 
 
6.4 Scope for alternative farming systems 
Farmers are continuously adjusting their farm practices to comply with changing 
needs and conditions. The responses will depend on the type of farm household. 
Poor households with much off-farm income may increasingly seek for employment 
opportunities outside agriculture to cope with uncertainties in agriculture. Wealthier 
farmers may bring in investments generated from other (off-farm) activities to 
innovate and upgrade farm activities. These groups may have the ability to adequately 
respond, though differently, to sudden and drastic changes imposed on their 
activities. Medium farmers, fulltime engaged in agriculture, may be less well able to 
deal with such changes. A more strategic approach for this group may be to advance 
their farm activities through incremental changes, i.e. little modifications introduced 
over longer periods of time. 
 
The farming systems in Hyderabad compare very will with the systems in its 
southern province Tamil Nadu. In this reports some preliminary observations from 
Tamil Nadu will be reported as well to substantiate the considerations for 
Hyderabad. 
 
Generally, crops and cropping systems can be selected such as to reduce water 
requirement. Particularly with regards to cropping sequences, substantial water gains 
could be obtained. Obviously, farmers should meet other objectives before any 
introduction or adjustment of crops or cropping systems would be made. On-station 
experiments and on-farm demonstrations plots show that much water can be saved 
by reduced irrigation frequency, such as in cotton, turmeric, chilly, maize and 
groundnut, while crop yields would be even slightly higher (Reddy et al., 2001). 
 
Agronomic measures related to soil management also inherit a number of options to 
reduce water use, while maintaining or even increasing yields. Mulching and zero-
tillage for instance reduce non-productive evaporation to the benefit of increased 
productive transpiration. By attuning fertilizer application to water availability, the 
efficiency of the entire system will increase. Yields may go up, water will be used 
more efficiently, while use efficiency of fertilizers increase as well. While this basis 
concept is well known, local fine tuning is needed to specific soil conditions, rainfall 
patterns, and crops. Adjustments of agronomic practices may have implications for 
the production system and their applicability should be considered from the entire 
farm household perspective. 
 
Dryland crops such as maize, cotton, sunflower and sugarcane are generally grown in 
furrow systems. Some crops can be grown closely without yield penalty, such as 
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wheat, because of minimal interference and competition between neighbouring 
plants. Yield penalty occurs in crops like maize as the cobs grow smaller because of 
competition from too close neighbours. Research has shown reduction in irrigated 
water requirement up to 50% if alternate furrow (instead of all furrows) are irrigated 
because horizontal seepage is sufficient to provide the remote rows with water 
(Raman, 2001). For crops that can be grown closely together, a reduction of up to 
70% irrigation water can be attained under paired row planting and furrow irrigation. 
 
Rice remains a staple food and rice cultivation is predominant in the state, which 
require higher amount of water than any other crops. Typically, total water input in 
rice fields varies from 500 to 3000 mm depending on environmental conditions and 
the length of the growing period (Bouman and Tuong, 2000; Bouman et al., 2003), 
with a water productivity ranging from 1000-2000 liters water per kilogram rice, but 
may be as high as 5000-10000 liters. Dry cereals, such as wheat have typical water 
requirements of 500 to some 1500 liters per kilogram of grain. 
 
Incited by the looming water crises, such as the recurring shortages of water that 
reduce the rice cultivate area, much effort has been put recently to reduce the use of 
water for rice production (e.g. Bindraban et al., 2006), including in Hyderabad and 
Tamil Nadu. 
In Andra Pradesh, Reddy and Krishna (1998) tested dry seeding of rice to cope with 
the unreliable availability of irrigation water and found similar yield levels as with 
sowing when soils are inundated. Raman (2001) report possible saving of water use 
in rice up to 40-50% without substantial penalty on yield in Andra Pradesh. Studies 
on water saving rice cultivation revealed that the rice farmers of Tamil Nadu can save 
nearly 50% of the water compared to the conventional method of flooding the rice 
fields. Thiyagarajan et al. (2002) reported that the water productivity in rice can be 
increased by about 40 and 47% in wet and dry seasons respectively, using an 
alternative wetting and drying irrigation scheme. Rice soils are kept at soil saturated 
condition rather than flooding through more frequent irrigation with less water per 
irrigation. 
 
Preliminary results of farm household research in Tamil Nadu suggest that quick 
adoption and adaptation of water-saving rice is not likely. The implications to the 
household are substantial. The labor profile changes, the reliance on reliable water 
supply increases, practical experience with several of the management practice is 
lacking, etc. For farmers to adopt all these changes, the yield gains should be 
substantial in view of all the required changes in management, in order to result in 
higher profit margins. Water-saving in itself is not a mean driving force to change 
their practices. Higher income could, but is still bound to the many internal and 
external factors to the farm. By grouping farm households more in-depth insight in 
the farmers view might be generated in order to better attune new water saving 
technologies to their needs. 
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6.5 Preliminary results from survey of farming systems 
The entire sub catchment of Krishna river basin from Nagarjuna sagar to Prakasam 
barrage is the study area. The entire sub catchment covers total 151 mandals in 13 
revenue divisions of 7 districts i.e., Mahaboobnagar, Khammam, Nalgonda, 
Warangal, Ranga Reddy, Prakasam and Guntur. Two to three mandals with 
maximum total cultivated area from each revenue division are purposively selected. 
Thus, total 25 mandals are selected from 7 districts. From each selected mandal 5 
sample farmers, thus total 125 sample farmers from selected 25 mandals in 13 
revenue divisions of 7 districts will be covered under survey for primary data 
collection on ‘Farm typology and choice of farming systems’. 
 
Secondary data have been collected for the basin and still need to be analyzed and 
summarized. Based on primary data collection so far covered 25 sample farmers in 5 
mandals of 2 districts i.e., Khammam and Warangal the following observations can 
be made. 
• Most of the farmers are maintaining on an average 2-3 milch buffaloes for 
household  milk purpose and in general almost all farmers are maintaining  
on an average 4-5 poultry birds. 
• In some urban area few farmers are growing plantation crops like Subabul 
and  Eucalyptus this year. 
• The farmers in the two districts are willing to shift to new crops if there is a 
great demand and high market price provided. However, majority are raising 
improved varieties only which have demand in the market.  
• In Khammam, Wyra division sample farmers are interested to undertake 
additional leased in land as they have sufficient irrigation source from canal. 
 
These observations reveal the high diversity and farmers need to secure food, while 
the introduction of activities for the markets is welcomed only under sufficient 
market demand. 
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7 Scope for improvement of ecological benefits by allocative 
water management  
Ingrid Gevers20 en Willem Brandenburg21 
 
7.1 General outline 
For a triple P (people, planet, profit) development of the Krishna estuary, the 
coastal resources have to be restored, conserved and sustainably managed. 
This may conflict with the interests of local communities and other 
stakeholder groups depending on the coastal resources for their livelihoods. 
The establishment of integrated multi-trophic aquaculture systems, producing 
both plants and animals for local income generation may lead to stakeholder 
support. 
 
 
7.2 Backgrounds of degradation of deltaic ecosystems 
The coastal waters of Southeast Asian countries have some of the world’s 
richest ecosystems characterized by extensive coral reefs and dense mangrove 
forests. These waters are further enriched with nutrients from land which 
enables them to support a wide diversity of marine life.  
 
The coastal zones are subjected to increasing population and economic 
pressure pressures manifested by a variety of coastal activities such as fishing, 
coastal aquaculture, waste disposal, salt-making, tin mining, oil drilling, rural 
construction and industrialisation. Indiscriminate logging and mining in 
upland areas impact on low land activities such as fisheries, aquaculture and 
coastal tourism. Unregulated fishing effort and the use of destructive fishing 
methods have caused serious destruction of fish habitats and fish stocks. 
Indiscriminate cutting of mangroves for aquaculture development, fuel wood 
and timber has brought temporary gains in fish production, fuel wood and 
timber supply but losses in nursery areas and commercially important fish and 
shrimp, coastal erosion and land accretion. 
 
The Krishna River basin in India, covering an area of 258,000 km has a 
combined population of 67 million and is spread across three large southern 
states—Karnataka, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh. It is one of India’s largest 
domestic waterways and supplies water to important food production areas 
including the “Rice Bowl” region in the Krishna delta. Water extractions for 
agriculture, industry, and domestic uses from the Krishna continue to grow 
to support one of the fastest developing regions of peninsular India. Rapid 
urbanization in the basin also makes demands on water supplies, resulting in 
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adverse social, economic and environmental impacts. As the three states 
share the shrinking water resource, basin closure has resulted in interstate 
water conflicts. 
 
The Krishna river is a critical component of the delta estuary coastal sea 
ecosystem. The river run-offs provide energy for a number of vital processes 
in downstream estuaries, delta and coastal areas, upon which healthy fisheries 
are dependent. These processes include transport of nutrients, organic matter 
and nutrient-rich silt, oxygen enrichment, entrainment of nutrients in bottom 
sediments, dilution and flushing of pollutants, etc.  
 
The storage capacity in the Krishna basin has increased significantly since the 
independence of India. At that time 3.2 km3 of the total water flow was 
stored upstream. Nowadays, the increased fresh water need for mainly 
drinking water, irrigation and industrial purposes in the upstream areas of the 
river basin has led to an increased total storage capacity of 34.5 km3. This has 
resulted in a significant decrease of fresh water flow into the Krishna estuary 
and an increase of saline water intrusion. Bouwer et al (2006) have studied the 
combination of this increased water use in the upper Krishna river basin in 
view of the expected climate change. They concluded that the impact of salt 
water intrusion will increase even more in the next decennia. 
 
Conversion of mangroves in the delta of the Krishna river basin for 
agriculture, aquaculture and salt pans resulted in saline soils and loss of 
biodiversity due to environmental degradation. The reduced fresh water has 
had a large impact on the growth and regeneration of mangroves. Land-use 
activities such as agriculture cause pollution and drainage of the tidal areas is 
problematic. 
 
 
7.3 Coastal ecosystems, saline aquaculture and agriculture 
Coastal mangrove ecosystems are the natural nursing grounds for hundreds 
of aquatic species including economically important fish and shellfish. 
Mangroves play an important role in controlling erosion caused by flooding 
and storm surges. They also act as a barrier during cyclones and protect the 
coastline. Thus it is necessary to conserve the existing mangroves and plant 
mangroves where ever they can be grown near the shrimp ponds. Mangroves 
will also help in reducing the impact of sea level rise anticipated due to global 
warming and will protect the adjacent farming lands.  
 
Salinisation in the coastal zones of Andhra Pradesh is increasing. Such is very 
obvious in the lower Krishna River Basin. Andhra Pradesh is the main state 
producing aquaculture shrimp for export purposes. Both larger companies 
and small scale farmers have invested in this business. For the construction 
of ponds large parts of the natural coastal zone vegetation has been removed. 
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Nowadays, most of the coastal mangrove vegetation has been converted to 
aquaculture ponds, salt pans and paddy fields.  
Outbreaks of viral diseases are the major constraint to shrimp aquaculture 
production. White spot disease (WSD), vibriosis and loose shell syndrome are 
the most common disease problems in India. The most successful strategies 
for controlling diseases in shrimp ponds are based on a combination of 
prevention by exclusion, and Better Management Practices that focus on 
creating a healthy, non-stressful environment for the shrimp.  
 
Outbreaks of diseases, fluctuating in market prices and lack of capacity, 
expertise and financial means have caused a lot of small scale farmers to look 
for alternative sources of income in Andhra Pradesh.  
 
Moreover, the traditional scheme of rice cultivation is under threat unless the 
local farmers are in a position to plant salt tolerant rice varieties. ANGRA 
University conducts trials at their local research station located in the estuary  
of the Krishna river basin, to identify which local rice varieties are more salt 
tolerant. The results of the trials are promising. 
 
Not only small farmers face difficult times, but also the local fishermen. With 
the collapse of coastal zone vegetation, the nursery of fish and shellfish has 
gone.  
 
The development of sustainable aquaculture practices, inclusive of the 
restoration of mangrove vegetations is essential (Rönnback, 1999). This was 
also the main conclusion of the stakeholder meeting held at September 21, 
2007 in Manchilipatnam, a town located in the delta of the Krishna river 
basin.  The purpose of the workshop was to facilitate a multisectoral dialogue 
between various stakeholders around the concept of salt water farming, 
including good aquacultural practices, as an alternative livelihood approach 
for the coastal zone.  
 
 
7.4 Scope for rehabilitation of coastal areas 
Two mangrove restoration programmes are already being implemented in 
Andhra Pradesh. One is coordinated by the Swaminathan foundation in the 
East Coast of India, especially Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. 
Another restoration programme is implemented by OMCAR and 
DEEPWAVE (Balaji & Gross, 2006). The FAO has acknowledged that 
restoration of mangrove vegetations throughout Southeast Asia is key for the 
realisation of sustainable fisheries and aquaculture practices (FAO, 2005). 
 
In order to establish a sustainable biological production system one should 
follow the principle of integrated multi-trophic aquaculture (IMTA) i.e. with a 
closed nutrient cycle, with sanitary precautions and a good combination of 
low input and economic benefit. It is therefore necessary to combine both 
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animal and plant production systems in such a way that the nutrients that 
come from the animal production systems are taken up by the plant 
production systems. The integrated system has to be designed in such a way 
that the dimensions of the different components meet the requirements for 
the mentioned closed nutrient cycle: saline water IN = saline water OUT. 
This condition is set by the combination of both a production system and 
coastal nature conservation, as laid down in the scheme below: 
 
 
 
Andhra Pradesh has a coastal zone with a length of 600 km and has a 
potential ranging from 300,000 – 500,000 ha for integrated multi-trophic 
aquaculture. 
 
When looking at issues such as food security and competing claims in the 
field of renewable energy, nature conservation and other societal functions, it 
is obvious that integration towards multifunctional land use alone can hardly 
meet all claims at the long run. At the same time the marine and coastal 
resources are still being used in a very similar way as centuries ago; the main 
human activities still being collecting, hunting, mining and dumping. Mankind 
thus threats the marine resources but overlooks the marine potential of triple 
P sustainable biological production: fish, crustaceans, shellfish, seaweeds and 
micro algae.  
 
Keeping India’s ambitions in the field of economic development, food 
production, renewable energy production, and at the same time conservation 
of its biodiversity in mind, mariculture could have great potential in the 
coastal zone of Andhra Pradesh close to the mouth of the Krishna River. The 
on-going shrimp production has resulted in the destruction of mangrove 
ecosystems that now are understood to have an important function in coastal 
defense as well as breeding, nursing and feeding ground for marine 
organisms. Starting with mangrove restoration programmes, it is worthwhile 
looking at the possibility of including the establishment of seaweed farms in 
the development planning.   
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Today, seaweeds are recognized as an important natural source to produce a 
range of products, such as minerals special proteins, carbohydrates, fatty 
acids and a range of special secondary metabolites. Increasing interest in 
these products has been expressed by the food and pharmaceutical industry, 
the personal health care industry and recently the energy sector.  
 
Traditionally, seaweeds were collected in the sea both in temperate and 
tropical regions. One of the first applications of these sampled seaweeds was 
as green manure in agriculture. Presently various seaweed production systems 
are designed: offshore, near shore and even at the landside in pond systems. 
Many of those systems are, however, not sustainable due to their polluting 
impact on the marine environment.  
 
Energy Centre the Netherlands (ECN) and Wageningen UR (Wageningen 
Imares, the marine and coastal resources institute at Yerseke and Plant 
Research International at Wageningen), in partnership designed a production 
system for seaweeds which aims to produce in a sustainable productive way 
and is balanced in its energy costs. The principle behind the production 
system is to make optimal usage of the photoreceptor systems in seaweed, to 
apply a precise nutrient feeding technique and to use the marine environment 
as an energy source for the processing of the harvested product. It is 
estimated that it should be possible to produce at least 70 tonnes dry 
matter/ha/year under tropical zone conditions. Such yields are feasible, if 
adequate plant nutrition is provided. 
 
Seaweed is of increasing importance globally; the global market values about 
U$ 600 million and is growing annually with 10%. Seaweed is harvested for 
hydrocolloids: alginates, carrageenan and agar. Seaweed does not contain 
lignin or lignocelluloses. Consequently, 80% of its dry matter - under Indian 
conditions 56 metric tonnes - is fermentable. It is therefore an efficient 
resource for the combined ethanol and electricity production. Based on these 
figures it can be concluded that seaweeds could provide and important 
resource in terms of food (binding agency in food processing) and bio energy 
for India. The Andhra Pradesh district appears to be geomorhologically 
suitable for the establishment of seaweed plantations with near shore 
processing of biomass based on seaborne energy sources by nutrient 
upwellings.  
 
The two figures on the next page show the areas with high potential for 
seaweed production farms in India and Andhra Pradesh in particular. 
Following a schematic representation of a seaweed plantation is shown. 
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Figure 2. Bay of Bengal      potential locations of seaweed plantation 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Krishna river basin        location of seaweed plantations 
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  Green seaweed lines above 
  Brown or red seaweed lines underneath 
  Anchor cables 
 
 Figure 4. Schematic presentation of a seaweed plantation: 
 
Seaweed lines also function as devices for (additional) plant nutrition. 
 
The possibility for the introduction of saltwater agriculture in the Krishna river basin 
delta still needs to be further explored and developed in partnerships with local, 
regional and state authorities and relevant science institutes such as Swaminathan 
Research Foundation, MPEDA-NACA and ANGRA University. A larger 
consultation workshop in which these different stakeholder groups participate and 
discuss how these concepts of salt water farming can be realized would be a good 
approach for follow-up. Concrete action plans can then be formulated and 
stakeholders can commit themselves to a longer term involvement and investment in 
such concepts. Once implemented the lessons learned can be taken to other parts of 
India or could result in the development of an international salt water farming 
programme for coastal areas in tropical and sub-tropical climates. 
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8 Management information system for allocative water 
management  
Herco Jansen, Christian Siderius,22, G. Ravi Babu, A. Mani,23 
 
8.1 General outline 
Allocative water management requires that the water management entities have 
adequate information on the available water resources at any time, and at the 
appropriate level, and on the repercussions of any management intervention (either 
strategic or operational). Such information requires a decision support system which 
can assess the land and water resources. Information on the hydrology and available 
water resources should be obtained through a hydrological system analysis and a 
monitoring system.  
 
The activities undertaken in this project were aimed at developing a general 
applicable methodology to obtain a decision support system on land and water 
resources.  In order to be flexible and easily implementable in other areas, a land and 
water resources model was developed, which requires minimum data collection, 
which is not location-specific and which does not require (time consuming) primary 
data.  
 
 
8.2 Land and water resources model 
The river basin model concept HydroSplash! was further developed and applied to 
assess the spatial and temporal availability and requirements of water resources (Smit, 
2007).  
 
The model has been integrated in a GIS environment to allow for rapid spatial 
assessments and planning, using free-of-charge (internet) and other easily obtainable 
data (minimum data requirements). The model can thus primarily support water 
managers in the (re)allocation of water and in setting the right priorities in times of 
water scarcity. 
 
 
8.3 Area selection 
Allocative water management can only be effectively implemented if land and water 
resources are managed at (sub) catchment level. The project envisages to develop 
generic methodologies and tools that can similarly be applied to other areas, or 
upscaled. In order to show their applicability these methodologies and tools have 
                                                          
22 Alterra, P.O. Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, The Netherlands 
23 Acharya N.G. Ranga Agricultural University, Rajendranagar, Hyderabad – 500 030, India 
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firstly been applied to a selected area. For the selection of the area the following 
criteria were applied: 
 
1. State:  The area should be in Andhra Pradesh. 
2. Catchment scale: The area should be entirely within one of the main 
river catchments. 
3. Relevance:  In the catchment water management problems should 
already be experienced, such as water shortages, excess 
water, problematic spatial or temporal distribution of 
the water resources and/or (potential) conflicts 
between water uses. 
4. Decision support:  The authorities should still be in the process of 
formulating policy options or planning, so that the 
outcome of the study may contribute to the decision 
making. 
5. Availability of data:  It should be possible to obtain sufficient existing 
(secondary) data. Collection of field data has to be 
avoided.  
6. Managerial aspects:  It should be possible to conduct the assessment within 
reasonable time. Hence the area should not be too big 
or too remote. 
 
Based on these criteria the (entire) sub-catchments that discharge into the Krishna 
River between the Nagarjuna Sagar Project and the Prakasam Barrage of Vijayawada 
were selected as study area. The area covers approximately 40000 km2 (approximate 
size of The Netherlands). The length of the section is approximately 160 kilometres 
and includes the districts of Nalgonda, Mahaboobnagar, Hyderabad and parts of 
Khamman, Warangal, Guntur and Krishna. Figure 5 presents the location of the 
study area.  
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Figure 5. Study area for holistic integrated water assessment modelling. 
 
 
8.4 Data collection and analysis 
Area delineation 
 
The delineation of the catchment was done with a digital elevation map with a 
resolution of 90 x 90 metres. This information is available from the internet at no 
costs. The main sub-catchments between the Nagarjuna Sagar Project and the 
Prakasam Barrage of Vijayawada are the Musi, Paleru and Munneru catchments 
(Figure 6). Table 4 present their main characteristics. 
 
Table 4. Characteristics of subcatchments 
Subcatchment: Musi  Paleru Munneru 
Area (km2) 11212 3263 10409 
Elevation (m.+MSL) 50-600 50-300 30-500 
Length of run (km) 267 153 196 
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Figure 6 Area delineation with main subcatchments 
 
Spatial resolution 
 
The data were collected for the entire sub-catchments.  
 
Mandals are the smallest unit for which adequate secondary data are available (spatial 
resolution). The number of mandals in the study area is in the order of two hundred. 
Figure 7 presents the locations of the mandals.  Data that are only available at a 
larger scale (district or sub-district level) were –where necessary- downscaled (e.g. by 
interpolation of regional data). High-resolution data were upscaled (by accumulation 
of data). 
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Figure 7. Mandals in the study area 
 
Selection of time period 
 
The calibration of the model was done for a recent average hydrological year. The 
calibration year was selected on the basis of the annual and monsoon rainfall data. 
These data were collected for the period 1991-2004 (fifteen years) at all rainfall 
stations in the study area. The annual and monsoon rainfall data were analysed and 
compared with the (long-term) mean annual and monsoon rainfall data. Figure 8 
shows that the rainfall varies from year to year and also has a distinct spatial trend.  
 
On the basis of the rainfall analysis the year 2001/2002 was selected as “representative 
average hydrological year”. This year was used for the calibration of the model, and also 
serves as “reference year”. Results of scenario calculations can be compared with the 
reference year. 
 
In addition, a dry year was selected to investigate the implications of low rainfall for 
the availability, use and management of water resources in the catchment, and to 
recommend on prioritization. The dry year will also be used to verify the model 
calculations. The year 2002/2003 was selected. 
 
The verification of the model for a wet year was omitted to save time, and because 
wet years are less relevant for this study. 
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Annual Rainfall of different districts in the catchment area
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Figure 8. Annual rainfall in the study area 
 
Data collection and processing 
 
The model is integrated in a GIS environment. Digital base maps were prepared 
using the extensive land resources maps by the National Bureau of Soil Survey 
(NBBS) and Land Use Planning (LUP), composed for each district in 2002.  For this 
purpose for each district the following maps were scanned: 
• Administrative divisions 
• Hydrogeomorphology 
• Land capability 
• Land irrigability 
• Land use 
• Soils 
• Soil depth 
• Soil slope 
• Soil texture 
• Water capacity 
 
The scanned maps were georeferenced and mosaiced in order to obtain images in the 
right projection (co-ordinate system), covering the entire study area. An example of 
the processing of a (printed) map to a digital GIS image is presented in Figure 9.  
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 Figure 9. Example of processing of map 
 
A GIS procedure was developed to classify the information on the georeferenced 
images in order to obtain maps with attributes (classified geographical information). 
After rastering these maps can then be imported in Hydrosplash! Figure 10 shows an 
example of a classified and rastered soil map. 
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Figure 10. Example of classified soil map. 
 
 
8.5 Scope for strategic and operational allocative water management 
In 2007 the GIS-based integrated land- and water management & assessment tool 
Hydrosplash! will be further developed on the basis of the outlines established in 
2006 and the feedback from the problem holders. 
 
At the time of issuing this report the model is being calibrated using historical data 
on climate, river discharges, reservoir levels, soils and land use.  
 
On the basis of acquired hydrological knowledge of the area and understanding of 
the responses of the catchment to hydrological events and land and water 
interventions, scenarios for improved water allocation and management will be 
formulated.  
 
The model will be used to simulate and evaluate possible strategic water management 
scenarios. An example of strategic allocative watermanagement (the concept) is 
presented in Figure 11. 
 
The model can also be used to recommend on water prioritization in times of water 
scarcity (operational allocative water management). 
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Figure 11. Concept of strategic water allocation. 
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9 Water allocation in the Krishna Basin: an institutional 
perspective 
Gerdien Meijerink24 
 
9.1 Introduction: the importance of institutions in the Krishna Basin 
For a long time, water has been regarded as a public good to which no one could be 
denied access. The growing scarcity and rising cost of water (supply) have led to the 
realisation that water has to be allocated and used more efficiently. This means that 
the allocation of use rights to water has become a crucial issue. Related to this is the 
role of institutions. As Ostrom (1993) has stated almost 15 years ago: “for the next 
several decades the most important question related to water resources development 
is that of institutional design rather than engineering design”. Institutions can be seen 
as the mechanisms or rules that specify how water is allocated, used and exchanged. 
Institutions exist at several levels (Source: Adapted from Williamson, 2000): 
 
 
Figure 12. Levels of institutions 
 
 
                                                          
24     Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) , P.O. Box 29703, 2502 LS The Hague, 
Netherlands 
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The focus of an institutional analysis is often on institutional arrangements or 
governance structures such as markets, or organisations (such as water user 
cooperatives). However, these are embedded in the formal rules of a society, 
specifying the permissible actions (i.e. “rules of the game”). Informal rules are often 
overlooked, but play an important role. They can be seen as overarching - the extent 
to which formal rules are obeyed depend to a large extent on the customs, traditions, 
norms and beliefs within a society. The formal and informal rules within a society are 
often denoted as the institutional environment, in which institutional arrangements 
are embedded. 
 
9.2 Water institutions in Krishna Basin 
9.2.1 Institutional environment: informal and formal rules 
 
How informal India’s water economy is, was explored in a large national-wide 
survey25 carried out in 1998 (NSSO 1999 cited in Shah, 2005). This showed that only 
10% of water infrastructural assets use (e.g. for irrigation) by survey households were 
owned and managed by either a public of community organisation; the rest were 
mostly privately owned and managed by household (or owned by a public or 
community organisation but not managed by either). A survey of almost 50.000 
farmers throughout India showed that 65% used irrigation and for half of those, the 
source of irrigation were informal, fragmented pump irrigation markets (see sections 
below for these markets). Thus India’s water economy – both domestic and irrigation 
use – is highly informal. Based mostly on self-supply and local, informal water 
institutions, having only little connect with public systems through which water law, 
policy and administration typically operate (Shah, 2005). 
 
India does not have any explicit legal framework specifying water rights, even though 
various acts have some basis for defining some form of such rights. All rivers and 
lakes are the absolute right of the state. While state’s absolute rights can affect the 
development and managerial aspects of water, from the perspective of water use, it is 
the de facto control over water by actual users at the micro-level that is more 
important. Individual rights to both surface water and groundwater are recognized 
only indirectly through land rights. In the case of canal water, the rights to access are 
limited to only those having access to land in canal command areas and these rights 
are only use rights and not ownership rights because irrigation acts do not allow the 
moving of canal water to non-canal areas. Under conditions of unequal land 
ownership and income patterns, the practice of linking water indirectly with land and 
the de facto control by better endowed persons emphasised rural inequality and water 
use inefficiency (Saleth, 2005). 
 
The central government has devolved several responsibilities and legislative powers 
to the state governments. The central government retains its control over major 
planning and technical resources and organizations such as the Central Water 
                                                          
25 78.990 households in 5110 villages 
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Commission, the Central Ground Water Board, and the National Water 
Development Agency--all under the Union Ministry of Water Resources. It also 
intervenes in inter-state dispute resolution. However, Saleth & Dinar (2000) report 
that a lack of constitutional power impedes the central government to coordinate 
institutional issues at the state and inter-state levels. Achieving country-wide 
consensus on national policies has also proven difficult. Since legislative power, 
technical capabilities, planning skills, and operational responsibilities are dispersed 
across government layers, the institutional environment pertaining to water remains 
“legally weak, functionally disjoint, sectorally biased, and regionally uncoordinated” 
(p. 28). While physical stress and financial crisis have exposed the legal, policy, and 
administrative weakness of water sector, myopic political issues and administrative 
resistance have impeded institutional change. The complex interrelationship between 
water and politics at several levels in South India was described by (Mollinga, 2001).  
 
At the state level, there have been several recent policy changes, especially in the case 
of states within the Krishna basin. These changes can be seen both in the 
organizational spheres (e.g., administrative reorganizations including the creation of 
basin organizations in states such as Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh) as well as in the 
policy spheres (e.g., declaration of water policy statements by most states). There are 
also more substantive changes in a few states. For instance, Andhra Pradesh and 
Madhya Pradesh have gone for a state-wide programme for the transfer of the 
management responsibilities of almost all canal irrigation below the outlet and minor 
levels (Saleth, 2005). In the sections below, we will briefly review several of these 
institutional arrangements. 
 
 
9.2.2 Institutional arrangements for groundwater use 
Around 55-60% of the population in India depends on groundwater (Shah et al., 
2003). A major use of groundwater is for irrigation purposes. Groundwater irrigated 
areas in India increased from around 11.9 million ha in 1979-71 to 33.1 million ha in 
1998-99 (i.e. increased with 178%), while the area under canal irrigation rose with 
37% (Aditi and Tushaar, 2005). Groundwater is usually pumped up through 
tubewells, although government and panchayat26 canals as well as tanks are used. 
 
The control over groundwater at the field level is governed by a de facto system of 
rights as determined by farm size, the depth and number of wells, pumping capacity, 
and economic power (Saleth, 2005). In India, following the English law, groundwater 
rights are attached to the land, such that a landowner can extract as much water as 
desired without any kind of restriction. However, to be able to do so, an investment 
in pumping equipment is required, which may impede the use of groundwater to 
poorer users. Besides this cost, land fragmentation may impede well owners to 
irrigate all their plots using a single pump. 
                                                          
26 A Panchayat is an Indian political system which groups five (“panch”) villages with each having 
appointed tasks and responsibilities. A Panchayat also refers to a council of elected members taking 
decisions on issues key to a village's social, cultural and economic life: thus, a panchayat is also a 
village's body of elected representatives 
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The fact that groundwater rights are attached to land means that anyone with land 
and resources to invest in a pump, can use groundwater. This has led to the 
emergence of highly dynamic and complex informal groundwater markets (see box 
1). Many water markets have sprung up like this throughout South Asia and function 
unimpeded and unaided by any kind of regulatory authority. An interesting feature is 
that the government has influence over groundwater pumping through electricity 
prices. For instance, when the new provincial (state) government of the water-scarce 
state of Andhra Pradesh announced in 2004 that electricity would be provided free to 
farmers, it led ‘colossal anarchy’ in the groundwater economy of South Asia (Aditi 
and Tushaar, 2005). 
 
Box 1 Advanced Ground Water Markets in Gujarat India 
 
There are a variety groundwater market arrangements in India (Shah, 1993; Saleth, 1998; cited in 
Dinar et al., 1997). In Gujarat, where water selling is an old tradition, market have become a 
sophisticated economic institution. The highly advanced water markets in Gujarat differ from 
elsewhere in South Asia in that (a) farmers invest in modern water extraction mechanisms (e.g., 
pumps) for selling water which has become a specialized subsidiary occupation, and (b) substantial 
private investment in underground pipeline networks generate high degree of competition amongst 
sellers of water. Once one seller establishes a pipeline network, he drives out of business several others 
who used unlined field canals to convey water to the buyers.  
 
Although the evolution of such “irrigation networks” is not uniform in different parts of Gujarat, 
agriculturally advanced areas have better developed networks. This type of investment in the water 
market may have a large multiplier effect. In addition to making the water markets more 
competitive, investments in conveyance and in water extraction increases efficiency in water and power 
use. 
 
Source (Dinar et al., 1997) 
 
With not much influence of the (state) government over groundwater use, and 
uncontrolled markets, it is interesting to note that communities have established 
(in)formal institutional arrangements for groundwater recharge, especially in water-
scarce states like Rajasthan and Gujarat (van Steenbergen, 2006). Roy et al. (2006) 
have analysed the institutional arrangements for groundwater use in Gujerat, which is 
part of the Krishna Basin. They analysed two tubewell cooperatives and six tubewell 
partnerships. We will make use of their findings in this section to analyse the 
effectiveness of such institutional arrangements.  
 
Despite the establishment of (in)formal institutional arrangements for groundwater 
recharge, a mounting problem is the depletion of groundwater reservoirs (see figure 
2). The National Water Policy of 2002 (MoWR, 2002) has recognised the need for 
more government control over groundwater resources: 
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“Exploitation of ground water resources should be so regulated as not to exceed the recharging 
possibilities, as also to ensure social equity. The detrimental environmental consequences of 
overexploitation of ground water need to be effectively prevented by the Central and State 
Governments. Ground water recharge projects should be developed and implemented for 
improving both the quality and availability of ground water resource.” 
 
The tubewell cooperatives and partnerships (hereafter organisations) operate quite 
independently from the government. Decision on the actual release of water, 
distribution of water among members (i.e. farmers), pricing of water, and collection 
of dues were all decided on by the organisation, without any involvement from the 
(state) government. Other activities such as planning for and actual capital 
investments, maintenance, monitoring of water use were decided upon by the 
organisation and individual farmers. What is unclear is how penalties are imposed 
and enforced. This seems to be a weakness in the design. However, the members of 
all eight organisations in the study seem very positive about the ability of their 
organisations to deal with resolution of disputes and dealing with offences. In fact, 
the members seem to positive about the overall functioning of the organisations and 
believe that the organisation has led to (amongst others) better maintenance of 
irrigation structures, equitable distribution of water and empowerment of farmers to 
manage irrigation systems. The equitable distribution of water is demonstrated by the 
fact that most members agree that the organisation has led to proper distribution 
between small and large farmers, and between head, middle and tail farmers. 
 
With respect to the financial sustainability and pricing policy, the success of the 
organisations seems less clear. Prices are not determined according to the scarcity 
value of water – thus environmental concerns are not incorporated into the price. 
Furthermore, although the organisation assesses the quantity of water each 
season/year, the activities of the organisation is rapidly depleting groundwater 
resources (see Figure 13). It is unclear on what basis prices are determined – some 
members seem to think it is on the basis of crops, although others disagree. 
Members seem to have no clear view on the financial viability of the organisation, 
although the organisation is able to raise recurrent payments from its members.  
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Source: (Roy et al., 2006)    
Figure 13: Water table level in Gujarat (depth in meters) 
78 DRAFT Wageningen UR-Report LWEM v040407.doc 
Although these community organisations seem to function well, especially in 
achieving equity, there are clearly two main problems. The first consists of the 
environmental effects (rapidly decreasing water tables) and the second is the financial 
viability connected to water pricing, which is unclear and not adequate. 
 
 
9.2.3 Institutional arrangements for surface water use 
Surface water through the canal system is another major source of water for 
irrigation, besides groundwater or checkdams. The institutions governing surface 
water are different than those for groundwater. All surface water in India falls under 
the jurisdiction and control of the state governments. The medium and major 
irrigation systems (commanding areas of at least 2000 ha) are governed by a 
government agency, while the small systems (less that 2000 ha) are usually governed 
by local agencies such as the village Panchayat. The government agencies deliver 
water to outlets that serve various farmers. The states set the rates that are charged 
for water and these vary considerably between states. In some states the water is 
provided free of charge, while others demand relatively high tariffs (e.g. 2750 Rupees 
or 47 € per ha in Gujarat). Also within states, tariffs differ. In Gujarat for instance 
rates vary from 70 to 2750 Rupees per ha (Namboodiri et al., 2006). 
 
Because irrigation through surface water (canals and tanks) has been practiced for 
centuries in India, the institutional setting is complex. There are various water 
allocation rules (i.e. systems) that have developed such as the Waribandi system, the 
Shejpali system, the land class system, the Satta system and the Phad system 
(Namboodiri et al., 2006). All systems (except the small-scale Phad system) have in 
common that the (state) government has been the agency in charge.  
 
Many government-run irrigation systems are characterised by various problems that 
lead to inefficient as well as unfair distribution of water. The problems of the 
government run irrigation system in Andhra Pradesh are illustrative for other states 
in India. Most irrigation systems are in disrepair and dilapidated due to inadequate 
maintenance, leading to reduced command areas. The systems are characterized by 
low irrigation efficiencies and tail-end deprivation because head-enders appropriate 
most of the water for themselves. This situation was exacerbated by a lack of 
coordination among the various Departments of Irrigation, Agriculture, and 
Revenue. Lack of established operation and maintenance (O&M) procedures, 
inadequate funds for O&M, and ad hoc expenditures by the Irrigation Department 
resulted in inadequate maintenance. Most of the agency’s O&M funds were being 
spent on staff salaries; very little was being spent effective maintenance. As a result, 
major canals are silted and there are drains and damage to their lined sections. 
Dissatisfied farmers seeking more water, or water deliveries at the appropriate time, 
have tampered with irrigation structures causing further damage. Such unauthorized 
irrigation led to a low collection of water charges by the Revenue Department, as the 
measured water supplied was quite low (Peter, 2001).  
 
In 1997, AP and the World Bank embarked on a program for irrigation sector reform 
that devolved power from the government to water user associations (WUA) (see 
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Oblitas and Peter, 1999). This entailed major institutional reform (at a higher 
governance level as well as at a lower institutional arrangements level).  
 
The WUAs and canal cooperatives (CC) were evaluated by Namboodiri et al. (2006) 
for the Krishna Basin. Although irrigation users groups such as WUAs or CCs exist 
in all states, the organisational structure varies between states. The main organisation 
types are the two or three-tier systems, where three tiered systems have three levels 
(user level, 55 ha level and system level) and two-tiered systems have two levels 
(village WUAs and WUAs for distributaries channels). Although the organisational 
structure differ, the relationship between the WUA’s and the government is the same 
across the country. The transfer of irrigation management responsibilities to WUA’s 
has been done on a hydrological basis. Second, the governments retain the authority 
over large irrigation schemes. Third, the responsibilities transferred to WUA’s 
concern water distribution, maintenance and the collection of irrigation fees. The 
rates are set by the government (and vary widely between and within states). Finally 
the financial resources of the WUA’s are composed of part of the irrigation fees, 
crop area fees, as well as state government support.  
 
Namboodi et al (2006) found that for the members of the WUA’s it is sometimes not 
clear how the responsibilities between the government and the WUA’s are divided. 
For instance, around 30% did not know whether maintenance and repair of the 
irrigation structures were the responsibility of the UWA or the government. Similar 
percentages did not know about the responsibilities for monitoring (of use of water) 
and enforcing rules for misuse or waste of water. It is interesting to note that there is 
a fair amount of disagreement about whether the institutional set-up of the WUA’s is 
flexible and capable of adapting to change, which is an important aspect of 
organizations. Some feel that there are clear mechanisms in place for changing the 
rules of the organization if needed, others strongly disagreed. There was similar 
disagreement on whether the rules are rigid or flexible, whether there are regular 
reviews on the rules, and whether the management of a WUA has the authority to 
adapt the rules.  
 
There is also disagreement on the degree of compliance achieved within a WUA: for 
instance members disagreed on whether members are aware of and willing to follow 
rules, and whether the management has sufficient power the enforce rules. On the 
issue of whether the WUA’s have achieved efficiency (in terms of timely and 
adequate water supply, and better maintenance), most members agreed, although 
around 30% thought there was no difference between the new form of self-governed 
WUA and the old government-run system. The majority also agreed that the WUA’s 
have had a positive effect on equity, in terms of equitable distribution of water and 
empowerment of farmers to manage irrigation systems, although again, over 30% 
thought there was no difference between the new WUA’s and the old government 
system.  
 
The most negative impact of the WUA’s seemed to be on the environment – around 
70% of the members were of the opinion that the WUA’s are causing flooding and 
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water logging and that the activity of the institution is rapidly depleting ground water 
in the village.  
 
 
9.3 Economic instruments and institutional change for improved 
allocation 
 
Economic instruments can be seen as means that can be used by policymakers to 
alter the rules of the game. Since economic policy instruments are usually applied 
within existing rules, institutions, and policy processes, the policy and administrative 
contexts in which they operate become important. Too little attention has been paid 
to the importance of basic institutions of policy-making -- whether formal or 
informal. Institutions already in place, for example, may need to be modified or 
altered to support the use of economic instruments (Anderson, 2001).  
 
Economic instruments (EIs) encompass a rather heterogeneous toolkit of policies 
whose main defining feature is their reliance on markets and the price mechanism to 
internalize environmental externalities. The advantage of EIs as policy instruments is 
normally framed in terms of a contrast with the conventional approach applied in 
most countries which is a reliance on laws and regulations that dictate in some detail 
the measures which water users or polluters must adopt under penalty of fines or 
other sanctions. This approach, which is loosely referred to as ‘command-and-
control’ has been criticized by economists on grounds of both static and dynamic 
inefficiency (O'Connor, 1999). Economic instruments can be classified into 7 broad 
categories (Panayotou, 1994): 
 
1. Redefining Property Rights 
(i) changes in ownership, use and development rights 
2. Market Creation 
(i) tradable permits 
3. Liability 
(i) liability insurance legislation 
4. Charge Systems 
(i) effluent charges 
(ii) user charges 
(iii) product charges 
(iv) administrative charges 
(v) impact fees 
(vi) access fees 
5. Fiscal Instruments 
(i) pollution taxes 
(ii) input taxes 
(iii) importer tariffs 
(iv) financial aid in installing new technologies 
(v) subsidies for environmental research and development expenditure 
6. Deposit- Refund Systems and Bonds 
(i) deposit-refund schemes to encourage recycling 
Wageningen UR-Report LWEM v040407.doc  DRAFT 81 
(ii) environmental performance bonds 
(iii) land reclamation bonds 
7. Financial Instruments 
(i) financial subsidies 
(ii) soft loans and grants 
(iii) sectoral/revolving funds 
 
Whatever mix of economic instruments is chosen, problems of implementation can 
arise for several reasons (O'Connor, 1999): (i) administrative complexity exceeding 
public and private sector institutional capacity; (ii) political resistance from those who 
perceive themselves to be adversely affected; (iii) possible inconsistencies with the 
existing legal framework; (iv) design flaws involving a mismatch between the type of 
instrument chosen and the nature of the problem targeted— e.g., when applying, an 
instrument requires close monitoring of polluters, but the large number, small size, 
and geographic dispersion of those polluters makes such monitoring unfeasible. We 
will not discuss all the EIs in this paper, but will concentrate on redefining property 
rights and market creation, which we will combine to discuss tradable water rights. 
 
This report aims at studying the possibilities to reallocate water to the most 
productive land uses. We will consider only agricultural land uses for now. Different 
crops have different water needs per kg of crop yield. One could reason that 
increasing water productivity is to increase the ratio of crop yield per input of water. 
However, crops have different values – some crops have a high value per kg while 
others have a very low value per kg. So when we measure water productivity, it may 
make more sense to measure it in crop value per input of water. This means that 
water productivity depends on output prices of crops, and that water should be 
allocated to the highest value crops.  
But water also has an economic value that may differ per region as a function of the 
costs of water supply (which can reflect scarcity). It follows from this that in fact the 
ratio value of crop over value of water (cv/vw) should be maximised (which may 
result in different outcomes from the ratio crop yield weight over water input 
volume). 
 
 
9.3.1 Water pricing 
One way to influence (i.e. maximise) the ratio cv/vw is through pricing of water. 
Water prices in India (e.g. for irrigation) are still low, and below their economic 
value27. Increasing water prices (to reflect their real scarcity value) can lead to more 
efficient use. However, water pricing is a contentious and political issue in India, and 
raising prices to a level where they will have a real effect is a long way off (Saleth, 
2005). In a study on the Mula Canal in India (Ray, 2002) argues that water price 
policy is not the most effective ways to increase irrigation efficiencies and suggests 
three broad reasons for this conclusion. First, water prices cannot feasibly be raised 
                                                          
27 Recovered water charges, as a proportion of O&M costs, vary from 4.02 percent in Uttar Pradesh 
to 73.33 percent in Orissa, whereas the same as a proportion of water productivity vary from 0.28 
percent in West Bengal to 5.19 percent in Maharashtra (GOI 1992b cited in Saleth, 2005). 
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to the point where they can affect water demand and use; second, farm-level 
inefficiencies are not the most significant inefficiencies, at least on existing canal 
systems; and third, low water prices are frequently not the reason behind water-
intensive and inefficient crop choices. 
 
Water pricing is only feasible when payments can be collected. In the case where 
farmers pump groundwater from their own land, or from a river that is adjacent to 
their land (riparian rights), pricing water and collecting payments can be very difficult 
due to monitoring problems (it will be extremely difficult to measure each farmers’ 
water use). Thobani (1997) makes a similar point and adds that “ even if 
governments could find an inexpensive way to measure and monitor water flow, 
measuring the opportunity cost of water is difficult because it varies according to 
location, reliability, season, use, and water quality. (p. 164)”. He also points out that 
the political problems are even more intractable: “It is politically difficult to charge a 
farmer for water from a river that serves a town (and therefore has a high 
opportunity cost) a higher price than a farmer using water from a river that is not 
near a town. Similarly, it is difficult to charge profitable hydropower companies less 
than poor farmers. Strong farmer lobbies typically pressure politicians to keep water 
charges well below their opportunity cost”.  
 
Finally he discusses the problem that the price of land often already embodies the 
price of water rights. In areas with low rainfall, irrigated land may sell for ten times 
the price of un-irrigated land. If water is priced to reflect its opportunity cost, the 
land will be valued the same as un-irrigated land, resulting in an effective 
expropriation of farmers’ assets. The sheer magnitude of asset expropriation implied, 
the number of people affected and the socially disruptive aspects of such a policy 
change make it unlikely that any politician would propose it.  
 
 
9.3.2 Other pricing instruments 
Indirectly, the use of water can be influenced, e.g. through taxing water pumps or 
gasoline that is used by waterpumps. In Kenya, for instance, a registration fee has to 
be paid when a waterpump is purchased, after which a yearly fee is paid (although 
this fee is independent from the amount of water pumped because this is difficult to 
monitor). Using energy prices to regulate water use is not feasible in India, however. 
This emerges from the fact that the gap between energy cost and the net value of 
output per unit of power is very high. As long as this gap is substantial and can also 
be manipulated by crop choice, farmers will not reduce power consumption and 
hence, their power demand will be insensitive to power tariff changes (Saleth, 2005). 
 
 
9.3.3 Tradable water rights 
Tradable water rights (which amount to the creation of a water market) have become 
popular means to achieve economic efficiency and equity. The reasoning behind is 
that farmers should be allowed to sell their water shares to higher value uses both 
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within and without the agricultural sector. Such trades would be economically 
efficient and in the farmer’s interest. 
 
In fact,  groundwater markets are growing in magnitude and gaining in significance in 
India. While water selling practices in India are traced to the 1920s, more systematic 
documentation of this phenomenon started only since the late 1960s. This has 
occurred without any formal water rights system (Saleth, 2005). Saleth (1998) 
estimates that 20% of the owners of 14.2 million pumpsets in India are likely to be 
involved in water trading, providing water for 6 million hectares (15% of total area 
irrigated by groundwater). For water trading and water markets to arise, first property 
rights must be allocated (“first allocate then trade”). But because water rights in the 
Krishna Basin are already (implicitly) assigned – through riparian rights, water trading 
and water markets have existed for a long time already. Several authors have used 
some of these as examples of successful markets (see Dinar et al., 1997).  
 
In principal, water trading can be an efficient method for reallocating scarce water 
supplies. Water markets can also provide the appropriate economic incentives to 
improve the efficiency of water use and encourage the reallocation of water to 
higher-valued uses without encountering the traditional opposition of existing water 
users (Easter et al., 1999). However, Easter et al (1999) and (Mohanty and Gupta, No 
date) point out that some basic institutional and organizational arrangements must be 
in place to overcome a number of problems.  
 
In the Indian context, it is important to introduce necessary legal arrangements to 
facilitate the management of surface water on a river basin basis to overcome the 
problem of the fragmentation of basins by state boundaries and the lack of 
cooperation between them. Linked to this, the legal position on individual 
usufructuary rights for surface water must be clarified because as it is, there is no 
system to provide secure defensible and enforceable water rights. Riparian rights are 
the only (implicit) rights that exist. However, tradable (groundwater) water rights or 
water use rights need to be separated from land rights, which is not the case with 
many of India’s thriving water markets. Institutional arrangements will also be 
needed to deal with third-party effects that result from changed in return flows and 
overexploitation of groundwater. This may include establishing limits for withdrawal 
of groundwater. Informal (ground)water markets such as in India lead to overdraft. 
Farmers have an incentive to ignore the scarcity and buffer stock value of the 
groundwater and instead base their decision of the cost of pumping (equalling the 
market price of water). Ramasamy (cited in Easter et al., 1999) estimates that the 
overdraft in Coimbatore District is almost 5000 m3 a year and is affecting the tot net 
returns to farmers. Shah (1993) similarly report overdraft issues for Gujerat. Finally, 
institutional and organisations changes are required to broaden the market and make 
it more competitive (including canal infrastructure so that trade can take place over a 
larger area). And institutional arrangements are required for conflict-resolving 
institutional arrangements.  
 
Mechanisms to prevent monopoly control over water must also be established. 
These problems can be dealt with through the design of water rights including how 
84 DRAFT Wageningen UR-Report LWEM v040407.doc 
water rights are quantified, allocated, monitored and enforced. However, how to 
achieve this for groundwater is a difficult issue, because it is usually virtually 
impossible for a governmental agency to monitor a multitude of (small scale) water 
traders who pump up groundwater. However, several authors have pointed out that 
community organisations (such as water user associations) can be successful in 
monitoring and enforcing overdraft issues (Shah, 1993), (Blomquist, 1995, cited in 
Easter et al., 1999). The overdrafting problem can also be met by increasing the 
incentives for efficient water use and making it possible to purchase water from area 
where water is abundant (Shah, 1993; Easter et al., 1999). 
 
On the monopoly pricing, there is some evidence that informal water markets in 
India have this problem. The development of water markets have also been shown to 
be associated with the emergence of ‘water-lords’ (large farmers who become water 
sellers) and with contracts for the purchase and sale of water that are biased against 
the poor (Rawal, 2002).  
 
 
9.4 Conclusion and recommendations on institutions 
In general, the institutional environment in India is not conducive to efficient water 
use. (Saleth, 2005) sums up the problems by explaining the “ incentive gap”. Pricing 
of water is very low and rarely revised (i.e. increased), covering hardly 5% of water 
productivity (i.e., the difference between the average productivity levels of irrigated 
and rainfed lands) and 8 percent of O&M costs. Since even the low water charges are 
not fully recovered, the arrears are also accumulating over time in most states. 
Besides these effects on the financial side, the low and uneconomic water rates also 
lead to an incentive problem causing widespread water use inefficiency. The incentive 
gap can be approximated by the gap among water productivity, supply cost, and 
water rates. The incentive gap indicates not just the poor performance of pricing and 
cost recovery policies but also the absence of institutional conditions necessary for 
volumetric allocation such as the water rights including their legal and organizational 
requirements. 
 
However, institutional reform of the water sector, in order to (re-)allocate water to 
more water productive economic sectors to more water productive sectors is limited, 
especially due to the importance of the informal institutional environment and the 
ineffectiveness of the formal institutional environment. Hence the call for “getting 
the institutions right”. Care must be taken not take a “technocratic” stance, as 
Vermillion et al (2005) pointedly draw attention to: 
 
“A lot of institution building goes on informally and incrementally at operational levels (…). 
In the future, it will become increasingly important (…) to better understand the limitations 
of comprehensive, technocratic planning for complex irrigation systems and river basins with 
multiple users and sources of water. The automatic response of technocrats to environmental 
complexity is to call for more and more sophisticated information and management systems. 
Perhaps a more realistic response would be to recognize the limitations of comprehensive, 
integrated planning, and augment these efforts with an equally important process of 
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participatory decision making among diverse groups at multiple hydraulic or administrative 
levels. So much of water management and use activity occurs at sub-irrigation systems and 
sub-basin levels, that integrated water management at the system or basin levels may not 
capture most of the total picture.”(p. 502). 
 
Community associations (such as water users association) seem the right level of 
decision-making over water and experience has shown that they are able to 
successfully allocate water among its members. It seems that the less government 
intervention in these associations is the better: “In decision making and rules crafting, the 
authority needs to be devolved to local farmers, rather than imposing on them insensitive and rigid 
rules” (Bardhan, 2001). Authority over water allocation should be squarely placed at 
that level, and this may also entail establishing water rights at this level. Government 
intervention is required, however, to deal with issues that this encompass the level of 
the community, such as third-party effects (consisting mainly of environmental 
effects such as groundwater depletion). Rawal (2002) for instance shows that 
community associations which can be described as non-market interventions in 
water-sharing can indeed lead to efficient and equitable development and 
management if water resources.  
 
On market interventions, the current challenge in India is to establish formal water 
markets, which will expand the scope of trading and make inter-sectoral water transfers 
possible (Mohanty and Gupta, No date). The legal basis underpinning formal water 
markets will enable the regulation of ecological sustainability. However, there are 
many complicated issues to be dealt with for viable formal water markets to emerge. 
Again, community organisations can play an important role in these. 
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Appendix 1 Framework used to derive returns to water 
An existing Excel-based spreadsheet mode has been used. AGWAT(F) is an Excel 
Spreadsheet with six 'worksheets', developed by Perry. Three of these worksheets 
contain only data which the user is required to insert. The remaining three 
worksheets contain only computed results. Locations where data may be entered are 
Grey cells. The three input data sheets are Prices Data, Farm Data, and Labor and 
Irrigation, which contain sample data. The data are invented as a basis for explaining 
the analysis. 
 
Data Entry 
 
The Prices Data Worksheet contains the name of the currency (Rs), names of the of 
the crops (Rice, Maize, Cotton, Wheat), prices for each crop, any byproduct, and 
seed (Rs3000/ton, Rs100/ton and Rs40/kg in the case of Rice) and the cost of canal 
irrigation services which may be either per hectare (Rs600 for rice) or per cubic 
meter. Fertiliser prices are also listed (Rs4000/T for N). The observed minimum and 
maximum daily rates for hired labour (Rs15 and Rs50) are specified, as are the 
minimum and maximum charges for well water (Rs50 and Rs100) per thousand cubic 
meters. 
 
 
  CURRENCY Rs 
   Crops Byprod Seeds Water Water Fertilisers-Rs/T
Rs/Ton Rs/Ton Rs/kg /ha /000m3 N  4,000 
Rice 3,000 100 40 600 P  2,500 
Maize 2,000 200 20 200 K  3,000 
Cotton 7,500 150 150 300
Wheat 4,000 500 70 400
Hired Labor-Rs/day 
   min 15 
   max 50 
Groundwater-Rs/000m3 
   min 50 
   max 100 
PRICES
 
 
The Farm Data Worksheet includes the farm size, the monthly availability of family 
labour, and the on-farm irrigation efficiency (2ha and 25 days/month, and 80% 
respectively). The basic input-output data for the farm are included in a table - the 
cropping pattern for each of the crops specified in the Prices Data table (in terms of 
percentage of the farm area - this in the example, with 40% of the farm area under 
Rice, the physical area under Rice would be 2ha x 40%, or 0.8ha). Yields of the crop 
and any by-product are specified, together with input usage rates for fertilisers and 
any chemical or other 'per hectare' inputs. The available family labour is also 
specified (25 days per month in the example). Note that the total percentage area 
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cropped (155%) is in excess of 100%; the first three crops are grown in one season, 
while the wheat is grown in another season. 
 
Farm Size 2.0 Ha
Family Labor Available-day/month 25
Farm Irrigation Efficiency (%) 80
AREA  Output (T/ha)  - - Rs/ha - - 
% crop byprod N P K Seed Chem Other
Rice 40 3.5 0.8 70 20 60 50 500
Maize 20 2.5 0.5 20 10 30
Cotton 20 2 0.2 120 90 40 40 1000
Wheat 75 2.5 0.5 80 80 40 200
- -- - - - Inputs (kg/ha) - - - - - -
 
 
 
The Labour and Irrigation Data Worksheet includes the monthly inputs required per 
hectare of crop. Crop irrigation requirements are specified in terms of millimeters per 
month, and should be specified by the user to include effective rainfall. Labour 
requirements are specified in the same format. In the example, Rice requires 50 days 
labour in June per hectare of crop, and the farm level requirement will be computed 
based on the farm area under Rice. AGWAT does not compete with programs such 
as CROPWAT, which should be used for more detailed analysis of crop water 
balances. Finally, the monthly availability of canal irrigation water to the farm is 
specified in thousands of cubic meters - here assumed to be constant at 3,000 
m3/month from June to October. 
 
    L A B O R   R E Q U I R E M E N T S
(Days per ha of Crop)
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
Rice 50 30 10 10 10 60 170 
Maize 20 20 20 10 30 100 
Cotton 20 20 20 20 15 20 20 60 195 
Wheat 10 10 5 20 45 
I R R I G A T I O N    R E Q U I R E M E N T S
A N D   A V A I L A B I L I T Y
mm/month
Total
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec ('000 m3)
Rice 500 300 300 300 600 20 
Maize 150 150 150 5 
Cotton 250 200 150 150 150 100 10 
Wheat 250 150 150 250 8 
Canal Supply (m3) 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 15,000  
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Results 
 
In the Labour and Irrigation Demand Worksheet, the upper table shows the results of 
multiplying the Farm Size by the percentage area under each crop by the monthly 
labour demand per hectare. For Cotton in May the relevant figures are 2ha x 20% x 
20 days/ha/month, or 8 days. The total demand is calculated as the sum for each 
month of the demand from each crop. In May, with Cotton the only crop using 
labour, the total is 8. Since this is less than the available family labour (25, from Farm 
Data worksheet), there is no need to hire labour. In June, however, the total demand 
is 40 days, so 15 days are hired.  
 
 
FARM IRRIGATION DEMAND, SOURCES OF SUPPLY AND COSTS
(m3 / month)
Crop Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
Rice 5,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 6,000 20,000
Maize 750 750 750 2,250
Cotton 1,250 1,000 750 750 750 500 5,000
Wheat 4,688 2,813 2,813 4,688 15,000
Demand 4,688 2,813 2,813 4,688 1,250 6,000 4,500 3,000 4,500 7,500 500 42,250
Canal Supply 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Vol Charge (Rs)
Pumped (m3) 4,688 2,813 2,813 4,688 1,250 3,000 1,500 1,500 4,500 500 27,250
Rate (/'000 m3) 100 78 78 100 59 80 62 62 98 50 765.7
Pump Charge (Rs) 468.7 218.3 218.3 468.7 73.7 239.6 92.9 92.9 439.9 25.0 2338.1  
 
 
Note that in the price data we specified the maximum and minimum hired wage rates 
(50 and 15, respectively). AGWAT computes the total demand for hired labour in 
each month, then assigns the maximum price to the month of maximum demand 
(November, where 43 days of hired labour are required) and the minimum to the 
month with minimum hiring (April, 5 days), and scales between these two extremes 
depending on demand. In June, with an overall demand of 23 days hired labour, the 
daily rate is computed at Rs32/day so that the cost of hiring is 21 days at Rs32/day, 
or Rs726. The associated table - Farm Irrigation Requirements - computes the 
monthly and total demands by crop in a similar fashion.  
 
 
F A R M  L A B O R  D E M A N D
(Days)
Crop Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total
Rice 40 24 8 8 8 48 136
Maize 8 8 8 4 12 40
Cotton 8 8 8 8 6 8 8 24 78
Wheat 15 15 8 30 68
Demand 15 15 8 30 8 48 40 24 22 20 68 24 322
Family Labour 15 15 8 25 8 25 25 24 22 20 25 24 236
Hired Labour 5 23 15 43 86
Wage Rate (Rs/day) 15 32 24 50
Wage Payments (Rs) 75 726 363 2,150 3,314  
 
The water requirements are totaled by month, and where canal supplies are 
inadequate to meet demand (for example, June where demand is 6,000 m3 and canal 
supplies are 3,000 m3) water is assumed to be pumped to meet the deficit. The cost 
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of pumping is scaled between maximum and minimum demands (Rs100/m3 in 
January and Rs 50/m3 in November) as in the case of labour, to allow variation of 
supply with demand. Note that if maximum and minimum prices are set equal, then 
the cost of water will not vary with demand. Also, if canal supplies are set to zero, 
then all water will be pumped. If the required supply of pumped water is greater than 
known availability, it is up to the analyst to either (a) reduce the cropped area, or (b) 
reduce crop yields to reflect water shortage. 
 
The Crop Budgets table computes returns by crop on a per hectare basis. Value of 
production is simply yield multiplied by price (3.5 t/ha x 3,000Rs/t = Rs10,500/ha 
for Rice, plus 0.8t/ha x 100Rs/t = Rs80/ha for the by-product). The costs of NPK 
and other per hectare inputs are similarly calculated. The cost of hired labour is more 
complex, because the costs of hiring must be allocated on a crop-by-crop basis. This 
is done by computing the proportion of total demand that each crop accounts for in 
each month, and distributing the total cost of hired labour for the month on this 
basis.  
 
CROP BUDGETS PER ha
GROSS TOTAL
Crops Crop by-product RETURN NPK Other Labor /ha /'000m3 Pumped COSTS Average Marginal
Rice 10,500 80 10,580 510 2,500 2,926 600 844 7,380 3,200 (32)
Maize 5,000 100 5,100 110 600 1,130 200 187 2,228 2,872 1,790
Cotton 15,000 30 15,030 825 7,000 1,117 300 534 9,776 5,254 3,927
Wheat 10,000 250 10,250 520 3,000 50 400 916 4,886 5,364 5,114
VALUE OF PRODUCTION COST of INPUTS and WATER   NET RETURNS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Rs/ha - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
 
 
The cost of Pumped Water is similarly distributed among crops on the basis of the 
cost of pumped water in any month and the proportion of irrigation demand for 
each crop. With Gross Returns and Total Costs computed on a per hectare basis, the 
Average Return to each crop is calculated as the Gross Return less all costs. 
 
The Marginal Return is an additional indicator of the attractiveness and returns to 
each crop. Here the costs are based on the situation if an additional hectare of the 
crop is grown. Where labour is already hired in a particular month (or where water is 
purchased from a well) then all additional labour (or water) is purchased at the full 
cost - hence leading to higher costs than in the 'average' case where costs are a 
mixture of 'free' family and hired labour, and 'cheap' canal water plus pumped water.  
 
Farmers will generally be interested to increase production of the crops where the 
marginal return is highest - and it is interesting to observe that in the example, the 
marginal return Rice is sharply lower than the Average Return - because of the high 
incidence of hired labour in the cost structure, while Maize remains relatively 
attractive. Based on Average returns, we would expect farmers to be more interested 
in increasing rice than wheat. 
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The Farm Budget provides a picture of the overall farm business, based on the actual 
area under each crop (note that the Crop Budgets are per hectare of crop, the farm 
budget is for the whole farm). As well as showing the gross and Net Returns - which 
are indicators of the returns to land, the table also indicates the return to family 
Labour and to Water. 
 
FARM BUDGET
Income Farm COSTS Net
Crop per ha Area Income Inputs Labour Water Income Use Return Use
Rs (ha) Rs Rs (days) Rs/day 000 m3 Gross Net
Rice 10,580 0.80 8,464 2,408 2,341 1,155 2,560 77 33 20.0 0.4 0.1
Maize 5,100 0.40 2,040 284 452 155 1,149 29 39 2.3 0.9 0.5
Cotton 15,030 0.40 6,012 3,130 447 334 2,102 66 32 5.0 1.2 0.4
Wheat 10,250 1.50 15,375 5,280 75 1,974 8,046 62 129 15.0 1.0 0.5
Total/Ave 10,287 3.1 31,891 11,102 3,314 3,618 13,856 235 59 42.3
Cropping Intensity = 155%
Utilization of Available Family Labor = 78%
Proportion of Family Labor in Total Used = 73%
Family Labor
- - - - - - - - Rs - - - - - - - - -
Water
Return Rs/m3
 
 
Interpreting the results 
 
The first point to consider in interpreting the results is whether they survive a 'sanity 
check' - Do specific crops show huge positive or negative returns? Is the demand for 
water much higher or lower than observed availability? Is the calculated need for 
hired labour consistent with observed scarcity or excess of available labour? This 
review will often point to flaws in the data, and errors in data entry, and is always a 
useful and rewarding exercise. From the farmer's viewpoint, his primary goal is to 
maximise Net Farm Income. Are there obvious opportunities to do this? The Crop 
Budgets show that Cotton has a considerably higher Average Return (Rs5,254/ha) 
than Maize (Rs2,872/ha). We can quickly test the impact on farm income of 
switching 1% of the area from Maize to Cotton, so that the Cropping Pattern in the 
Farm Data table now reads Rice 40%; Maize 19%; Cotton 21%; Wheat 75%. The 
resulting Farm Budget is shown below. Comparing this with the base scenario, we 
see that income has fallen by shifting to the apparently more profitable crop. 
 
Why? In the base case, Maize income at the farm level was Rs1,149, Cotton income 
was Rs2,102 (total Rs3,251). Corresponding data for the new scenario, above are 
Rs1,084 and Rs 2,183 (total Rs3,267 - a gain of Rs16). But the higher labour demand 
of Cotton, competing with Rice in high-demand months induced a fall in Rice 
income from Rs2, 560 to Rs2, 480 five times the gain from the increase in Cotton! 
100 DRAFT Wageningen UR-Report LWEM v040407.doc 
Appendix 2 Characteristics of  existing farming systems 
 
Farm Typology on Freedom of Cropping pattern decisions 
Questionnaire on Land, Water, Ecosystems management in the Krishna 
River basin 
ANGRAU – Hyderabad, October 2006 
 
1) Farmer Details 
 
Name of the farmer  
Village  
Mandal  
District  
Education Illiterate  / Primary   / secondary  / UG / PG 
Occupation Agriculture / Employment (self, Govt, Private) 
Source of income Annual income / any  
 
2) Family size 
 
Family members No. Occupation Availability for farm 
work 
Days of work  
Male     
Female     
Children     
 
3) Assets (Inventory) 
 
Assets Units / No. Year of purchase Present value 
1) Land  
a) Wet 
b) Dry 
c) Irrigated dry 
   
2) Irrigation  
a) Systems without 
irrigation 
b) Systems with 
surface irrigation 
(without tanks) 
c) Systems with 
surface irrigation 
(With tanks) 
d) Systems with ground 
water irrigation 
e) Systems with 
conjunctive use 
 
   
3) Farm buildings/ Cattle 
sheds 
   
4) Live stock 
a) Bullock 
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b) Cows 
c) Buffaloes 
d) Poultry 
e) Sheep 
f) Goat 
g) Pig 
5) Farm machinery 
& Implements 
a) Tractor 
b) Power 
tiller 
c) Others 
 
 
  
6) Crop produce    
 
4) Land holding particulars  
 
 Acres  Guntas  Others 
 
Total land  Wet  Dry  Irrigated dry  
 
Leased in land: 
 
Leased out land: 
 
Is Availability of land ease? 
 
5) Cropping pattern –Production- Returns: 
 
Season/Crop Area 
covered 
Cost of 
cultivation 
Yield 
realized 
Market 
price/ q 
Gross 
returns 
Net 
returns 
1) Kharif 
a) 
b) 
c) 
      
2)Rabi 
a) 
b) 
c) 
      
3) Summer 
a) 
b) 
c) 
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7) Live stock units – Production – Returns: 
 
Production    Name of live stock 
 
No. of units 
Q.ty Bulk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 8) Input supply : 
 
           Wages (Annual/Season) Labour No. 
Kind Cash 
Permanent labour    
Availability of casual labour    
 
  Availability of other inputs: 
 
Inputs Q.ty Price/ unit Total value 
1) Seed    
2) Fertilizer 
a) N 
b) P 
c) K 
   
3) Agricultural    
chemicals 
a) Pesticides 
b) Fungicides 
c) Herbicides 
   
4) Irrigation Water    
5) Electricity    
6) Others    
 
8) Market: 
 
Component Description 
Distance to market (Km)  
Mode of transport 
(Bullock/Tractor/Lorry & its charges) 
 
Method of sale 
(Market/Local/Middlemen) 
 
 
9) Availability of water: 
 
Component Description 
Open well  
Bore well  
Canal  
 
Wageningen UR-Report LWEM v040407.doc  DRAFT 103 
Monsoon – Rainfall pattern (3-5 years): 
  
  
Good                Average               Poor  
 
 
10) Sketch of the Farm (include plot size) 
 
 11) Farmer aim/goal with his farming activity:  
 
 
           12) Farmers opinion on farming 
 
 
         13) Future perspectives 
 
 Will continue with farming as it is 
 Will diversify his/her farming activities 
 Will expand land area in future 
 Will seek additional income outside farming 
 Will retire and no successor 
 Will leave agriculture to work in other activities 
 Others 
 
      14) Other Remarks or Specific Information (Farmer side): 
 
 
   
 Maximize profit  Minimize risk 
 Seasonal income  Daily income 
 Resource conservation   Income stabilization 
 Secure self-sufficiency   Subsidiary income (Crop activity along 
with other non-farm activity) 
 Profit & resource Conservation  ??? 
  Satisfaction of family needs  ??? 
 Good -Happy with the farming 
 Normal - Satisfied with the farming 
 Poor - Struggling with farming 
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   15) Remarks of the Investigator: 
  
Progressive farmer: Implements Opportunities to improve his farming 
 Ordinary farmer: Can’t use Opportunities for improve farming  
Conservative farmer: Can’t see Opportunities to improve 
Impression of 
farmer 
 
Other  
Other  
  
 
 
 
